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Preface
In this dissertation I deal with two di¤erent topics that are both relevant for economic
well-being. On the one hand I analyse merger policies when merger control is not the
only policy instrument at the disposal of welfare maximizing governments. On the other
hand I give a foundation of the importance of Research and Development (R&D) by
exploiting an enlarged data set of R&D expenditure and capital as well as by treating
R&D as an investment in a growth accounting framework. Although both subjects
are related by the common motivation to be relevant for welfare maximizing economic
policy makers, they di¤er methodologically as well as with regards to content. While
the rst part of my dissertation analyzes the use of policy instruments from a purely
theoretical perspective, an empirical investigation of R&D in Europe is o¤ered in the
second part. Therefore the contribution at hand should be seen as consisting of two
parts whereby each part is divided into two chapters. I will give a brief introduction
to each of them in the following.
Both chapters of the rst part deal with merger control that is interacted with
another policy instrument: the optimal setting of taxes. The general idea is that there
are many situations where governments have more than a single instrument at their
disposal such that it is reasonable to think about potential repercussions between them.
This will be investigated in an open-economy setting with non-cooperative governments
and prot maximizing rms.
In the literature, merger control is typically considered as an isolated policy prob-
lem. Only few papers interact merger control with further policy instruments whereby
they usually focus on international trade policies (e.g. Horn and Levinsohn, 2001).
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Therefore the rst part of the dissertation o¤ers a contribution that combines two
strands of the literature, namely the one on strategic merger policies (for an overview
see for example Huck and Konrad 2004) with the one of optimal taxation. With respect
to the latter, I am dealing with optimal commodity taxation in concentrated industries
(see e.g. Keen and Lahiri, 1998). The resulting policy analysis can give more realistic
insights into policy decisions dealing for example with merger proposals in network
industries where specic regulation and sector-specic taxation tools often exist. Nev-
ertheless, priority has been given to an identication of the underlying incentives for
governments and rms in a merger scenario by choosing a very simple model instead
of trying to rebuild reality. The next paragraphs introduce the basic set-ups as well as
some main ndings of these two chapters belonging to the rst part.
Chapter 1, merger policy and tax competition: the role of foreign ownership
This as well as the second chapter considers an open-economy setting of a concen-
trated industry that is modelled by standard Cournot quantity competition. There are
two countries with national governments having a sector-specic tax or equivalent reg-
ulation policy at their disposal to inuence the market outcome after a national or an
international merger has taken place. Governments anticipate the behaviour of prot
maximizing rms. Firms, in turn anticipate governments tax response when they de-
cide on an (inter-)national merger. Finally, I study the implications for national welfare
maximizing merger policy when countries non-cooperatively set their production-based
tax rates. Moreover, a special focus lies on the consideration of di¤erent ownership
structures with respect to the location of the rmsshareholders. I nd that when for-
eign rm ownership is low in the pre-merger situation, non-cooperative tax policies are
more e¢ cient after a national than an international merger and smaller synergy e¤ects
are needed for this type of merger to be proposed and cleared. In contrast, cross-border
mergers dominate when the degree of foreign rm ownership is high initially.
These results give a complementary explanation to many others, why we observe an
increasing international portfolio diversication together with a rising share of cross-
border mergers in many countries.
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Chapter 2, merger policy and tax competition: the role of trade costs
This chapter continues the analysis of Cournot competition in oligopolistic markets
where governments choose an optimal production tax according to the market struc-
ture. In fact, I use the same basic setting but with further elements and a completely
di¤erent focus: trade costs, which were not included in the previous model, are added
such that their inuence on optimal tax policy and merger control decisions can be
analysed. Such savings, which can also be originated in the avoidance of trade barri-
ers, are still important and unlikely to vanish completely. This can for example be seen
by the ongoing negotiations to overcome further trade barriers in the Doha Develop-
ment Agenda of the WTO. The chapter nally focuses on a cross-border merger that
allows the merging rms to save on such trade costs. It is shown in a symmetric setting
with linear demand that the cross-border merger is not protable for the merging rms
despite the implied savings. This is due to a positive tax response of the national wel-
fare maximizing governments and implies that Salants famous merger paradox (Salant
et al. 1983) still holds here. Nevertheless, a cross-border merger is potentially welfare
improving due to the avoidance of ine¢ cient trade. Overall, additional synergy e¤ects
are needed in order to turn the cross-border merger protable and welfare enhancing
at the same time.
In the second part of my dissertation, the perspective changes from a theoretical
analysis of merger control and tax competition to an analysis of empirical ndings on
the importance of R&D in Europe. In the rst chapter of this part, an overview over
business R&D expenditures and capital in Europe is given by putting R&D into various
instructive relationships. This analysis is based on new estimates for 22 countries that
are constructed by updating and enlarging a database of the EU KLEMS consortium
(see EU KLEMS, 2008a). In the second chapter of this part, some of these new esti-
mates are used in order to show the implications of treating R&D capital as investment
in a classical growth accounting framework following Solow (1957). The overall purpose
of this nal chapter is to demonstrate the importance of an adequate treatment of R&D
as investment by discussing this framework and by using some illustrative examples.
Hence, there are again two related chapters to which I will give a rst overview in
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the following. Taken together, I contribute to the traditional literature of R&D that
has identied R&D as an important factor for fostering productivity (beginning with
Arrow, 1962) as well as to the present discussion about an adequate treatment of such
intangibles in growth accounting (e.g. Corrado et al. 2005) and in national accounts in
general, see for example the new recommendations in the system of national accounts
2008(European Commission et al., 2009).
Chapter 3, business R&D expenditure and capital in Europe
This chapter provides insights into the distribution and relation of R&D expenditure
and capital in 20 European countries at the industry level as well as on the aggregate
whereby the US and Japan are added for additional comparisons. The analysis focuses
especially on R&D capital stocks where new estimates of business R&D capital stocks
are presented.
A rst core result is that with 9 percent of GDP, the aggregate EU business R&D
capital stock falls short of its US and Japanese counterparts. Moreover, also large
disparities within the EU are detected: R&D capital stocks are much lower in the
southern and the new member states, reecting large and persistent disparities in
R&D expenditure. Investigating the evolution of R&D capital stocks, there was also
hardly any convergence over the past decade within the EU.
Turning to the industry-level, our data show that the R&D capital stock is concen-
trated on three broad technology-intensive manufacturing industries: chemicals and
pharmaceuticals, transport equipment and nally also on the industry category com-
puting, communication and other equipment. These industries are analysed in more
depth throughout the chapter. Another perspective, taken at the end of the analysis,
is to see how R&D capital is distributed in relation to tangible capital across industries
as well as across countries. Thereby, the resulting ratios suggest marked di¤erences in
how R&D and tangible capital are combined in production.
Finally, this chapter also provides a rst insight into the implication of R&D capital
stocks for growth accounting: a positive correlation between R&D capital stocks and
subsequent growth in total factor productivity as the residual of a standard growth
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accounting framework can be seen in our data set.
Chapter 4, R&D as an investment in growth accounting with an application to
Germany and Slovenia
Corrado et al.(2005, p.19) already state that any outlay that is intended to increase
future rather than current consumption should be treated as capital investment. From
this perspective, there is no justication why R&D should be treated di¤erently than
investment in physical capital. If done so, this has consequences for national accounts:
the level of gross value added (GVA) rises which is claried in the beginning of the
analysis in this chapter. It investigates the inclusion of R&D capital stocks in a growth
accounting framework from a methodological perspective and gives a rst snapshot on
the implications for the sources of growth in some industries of Germany and Slovenia.
Recognizing the rise of GVA, the chapter focuses on the implications of an identical
treatment of R&D and physical capital for a classical growth accounting model. Special
emphasis lies on the discussion of crucial assumptions, especially because R&D is partly
non-rival.
The presented framework is nally applied to some R&D intensive industries in
Slovenia and Germany using the R&D capital stock data outlined in the third chapter.
Due to some data limitations with respect to the complementary EU KLEMS data-
base (see EU KLEMS, 2008a and 2009), only a snapshot on the results of a di¤erent
treatment of R&D can be given so far. Nevertheless, this gives some rst interesting
insights because capital stock data for Slovenia were not existent before: especially the
rise in the level of industry GVA also translates into higher growth rates of GVA in
the shown example (Chemical Industry). Finally, total factor productivity shrinks if
R&D is included as additional capital asset. Moreover, the chapter gives an outlook
how this newly calculated total factor productivity that is not identical to the one
used in the previous chapter - could be used in future research.
Finally note that all these chapters are written as individual contributions such
that they can be read independently. Therefore some repetition, especially in chapters
two and four, has been inevitable.
Part I
Merger Policy and Tax Competition
- a theoretical analysis -
Chapter 1
Merger policy and tax competition:
the role of foreign ownership1
1.1 Introduction
Mergers have played a prominent role over the past decades, and international merger
activity has grown particularly fast. During the period 1980-2000 the annual number of
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has increased more than vefold in a large, worldwide
sample of rms and the growth of cross-border mergers was even higher, reaching more
than one quarter of the total by the end of this period (Gugler, 2003, Figure 1 and
Table 2A; Hijzen at al., 2008, Table 1). The number of cross-border mergers peaked
in 2000 and, after a drop in the rst years of the new century, rose again to an annual
level of almost 7.000 cross-border mergers in the year 2006 (UNCTAD, 2007). One
factor contributing to this rise in merger activity has been the changing policy stance
of merger control authorities. In many countries these have moved away from a strict
evaluation of market concentration ratios towards a exible case-by-case approach,
where the increased concentration of industry is weighed against possible e¢ ciency
gains and other positive side e¤ects of the merger.2 In fact, the most recent guidelines
on the assessment of horizontal mergers in the European Union (2004) stipulate that
e¢ ciency gains or improved products and services associated with mergers should be
1This chapter is joint work with Prof. Dr. Andreas Hauer from the University of Munich.
2See e.g. Mueller (1997) for a review of the history of merger policy in the United States.
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taken into consideration, and the overall benet to consumers should be the overriding
objective in assessing the desirability of a proposed merger.
This increased exibility of merger control and the emphasis placed on broadly
dened welfare objectives raises the issue of whether merger policy should also be eval-
uated in the light of its interaction with other policies, in particular in the eld of
taxation. Indeed there are indications that such interactions are already playing a role
in merger decisions. A case in point are network sectors, such as telecommunications,
electricity, or gas where merger activity has been strong in recent years due to expand-
ing prot opportunities in recently liberalized markets. In many cases cross-border
mergers were cleared by regulation authorities, even though they occurred in markets
that were until recently regarded as sensitiveareas of national economies.3 At the
same time, network industries are characterized by increasingly stringent regulation
and, in many cases, additional taxation.
In the German electricity market, for example, a series of mergers between the
eight large electricity providers occurred between 1997 and 2002. This left only four
large players in the market, two of which have sizable shares of foreign ownership.4
Nevertheless, all these mergers were cleared by the German regulation authorities. At
the same time Germany introduced a new electricity tax in 1998, and the initial rate
of this tax increased by more than 50% until 2003. Moreover, following the European
Unions directives, Germany extended sector-specic price regulation to the electricity
sector in 2005 introducing, for the rst time, price caps for the access charges of the
large, network-owning companies. A similar pattern was observable in the German
natural gas market, where industry consolidation also concurred with stricter regulation
and increased specic taxation since the late 1990s.
Another example is the United Kingdom, which has fully liberalized its energy and
utility markets in the early 1990s. In this process, foreign companies - among them
E.ON and RWE - took over sizable parts of the British network industries. In 1997
3There are, of course, exceptions. One is the highly publicized case of the leading Spanish electric-
ity provider Endesa, whose takeover by the German-based E.ON company was vigorously opposed
by the Spanish merger control authorities. This led to E.ON nally withdrawing its bid in 2007.
4The four large remaining companies are E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall. Of these, Vattenfall
is a 100% subsidiary of the Swedish-owned parent company and 34.5% of the shares of EnBW are
held by the French-owned EDF.
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the U.K. government levied a one-time windfall prot taxon all privatized utilities
including water, electricity, gas, and telecommunications. Since then a renewed impo-
sition of this tax has been repeatedly discussed as a complement to the regulation of
prices through the regulation authority Ofgem (O¢ ce of Gas and Electricity Markets).5
Finally, there are also examples where merger policies interact with industry- and
rm-specic subsidies, which are granted in order to improve or maintain the compet-
itiveness of domestic products in world markets. A case in point is the French elec-
tricity and transport company Alstom, which received nancial aid from the French
government that was approved by the European Commission in 2004. In exchange the
European Commission mandated that Alstom be opened to industrial partnerships. A
possible takeover by the German rm Siemens was blocked by the French government,
however. Arguably, this negative reaction to the potential merger was caused at least
in part by the French government anticipating that its nancial aid might eventually
benet a foreign-owned company.
Against the background of these and other examples, we argue in the present pa-
per that the possibility to levy industry-specic taxes and subsidies in a nationally
optimal way can have important repercussions on the position that national regula-
tion authorities take vis-à-vis a national or an international merger. In particular, we
argue that merger authorities will be more likely to accept a merger proposal, if they
can safeguard the interests of their resident population by means of tax and regulation
policies, once the merger has been enacted. To analyze the interaction between tax and
merger policies we investigate a setting of Cournot quantity competition between four
producing rms where two rms are located in each of two symmetric countries. Both
rms and merger regulation authorities anticipate that countries will adjust their tax
policies in a nationally optimal way after a merger has taken place. Hence we model a
three-stage game where the merger decision is made in the rst stage, tax policies are
set in the second stage, and rms choose outputs in the third stage.
An important feature of our model is that each rm may be partly owned by
foreigners, where the foreign ownership share is taken to be exogenous in our analysis.
5Most recently, this proposal was made in August 2008. See Fuel rms face threat of windfall
prot tax, The Times, 1 August 2008.
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This gives an incentive to each government to employ prot taxes that can be partly
exported to foreigners. This tax exporting e¤ect is familiar from the theoretical tax
competition literature (see e.g. Huizinga and Nielsen, 1997; Fuest 2005). Its empirical
importance has recently been demonstrated by Huizinga and Nicodème (2006), who
show for a European sample that countries with a high share of foreign rm ownership
also impose relatively high corporate taxes.
Our analysis considers both a (single) national merger between two rms in the
same country, and a (single) international merger between a home and a foreign rm.
For each type of merger we analyze under which conditions the merger will be simul-
taneously proposed by the merging parties, and accepted by the merger regulation
authority. The latter is assumed to base its decision on the merger proposal on the
comparison of the representative citizens welfare in the absence and in the presence
of the merger. We assume that each merger is associated with exogenous savings in
unit production costs. We then ask whether a national or an international merger is
more likely to occur, in the sense of requiring a lower critical level of cost savings for
its adoption.
Our analysis shows that the answer to this question depends critically on the degree
of foreign rm ownership. When all rms are nationally owned prior to the merger,
then a national merger will lead to more e¢ cient tax policies, as compared to the
international merger, and the national merger will be proposed and cleared for a lower
critical level of cost savings. This result is reversed, however, when the level of foreign
rm ownership is high initially. These results of our analysis point to a link between
the global trend towards a more geographically dispersed ownership structure of rms,
and the recent surge in cross-border merger activity.
Our analysis relates to two strands in the existing literature. First, there is a grow-
ing recent literature on merger policies in open economies.6 This literature, however,
typically regards merger control as an isolated policy problem for national or interna-
tional regulators. The literature that analyses the interaction of merger control with
6Contributions to this literature that relate to our analysis include Barros and Cabral (1994),
Head and Ries (1997), Horn and Persson (2001), Bjorvatn (2004), Lommerud et al. (2006), Hauer
and Nielsen (2008) and Südekum (2008).
Merger policy and tax competition: the role of foreign o. 11
other policy instruments is scarce, and it almost exclusively focuses on international
trade policies as the additional policy variable (Richardson, 1999; Horn and Levinsohn,
2001; Huck and Konrad, 2004; Saggi and Yildiz, 2006). In contrast, the interaction be-
tween merger policy and national tax policies has not been addressed in this literature
so far.7 A second literature strand on which our paper builds is the analysis of optimal
commodity taxation in oligopolistic markets (see Keen and Lahiri, 1998; Keen et al.,
2002; Hauer et al., 2005; Hashimzade et al., 2005). This literature, however, does
not address the implications for tax policy that follow from changes in the underlying
market conditions as a result of mergers.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 describes the basic framework
for our analysis. Section 1.3 presents the benchmark case of double duopoly, where
two rms are located in each country and all four rms compete in both markets.
Section 1.4 analyzes the changes in tax policies and welfare when a national merger
that generates cost savings is proposed in one of the countries. Section 1.5 carries out
the same analysis for an international merger. Section 1.6 asks under which conditions
one or the other type of merger is more likely to be proposed and enacted. Section 1.7
concludes.
1.2 The general framework
We consider a concentrated industry in an open economy model of two symmetric
countries i 2 fA;Bg. In each country i, there are initially two producing rms, indexed
with j. Firms 1 and 2 are located in A and rms 3 and 4 are located in B. All rms
are engaged in Cournot quantity competition and produce a homogenous good. The
location of all rms is xed throughout our analysis.8 Each rm can serve the other
market by exporting and, for simplicity, there are no trade costs when goods are sold
abroad. Hence there are four rms competing in each market in the initial equilibrium.
7A recent theoretical paper analyzing the interaction of tax policies and mergers is Becker and
Fuest (2010). The focus of their paper is very di¤erent from ours, however, and lies on the implications
of M&A activity for the desirability of di¤erent international tax regimes.
8See Janeba (1998) for an analysis of tax competition (but not of of merger policy) when the rms
in the imperfectly competitive industry are internationally mobile.
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The sales of rm j in country i are given by xij and the global sales of rm j are denoted
xj. Each rm maximizes its prot independently for each national market. We thus
assume that markets are segmented.9
Production is modeled in the simplest possible way. Capital (k) is the only factor
of production. In the benchmark case without e¢ ciency gains from mergers, each rm
requires one unit of capital to produce one unit of output. Hence xj = kj. Capital
is traded internationally at an exogenously given world interest rate r. The cost of
capital consists of the interest rate and a unit tax on capital ti, which is levied in
the source country of the investment. Given the above production function, this tax
can equivalently be interpreted as an origin-based production tax.10 In the absence
of mergers, the resulting production costs are then c1 = c2 = r + tA for the rms
producing in country A and c3 = c4 = r + tB for those in country B.
On the demand side we assume that there is one representative consumer in each
market who consumes good x and a numeraire good z, which is produced under con-
ditions of perfect competition. The consumers utility function is of the quasi-linear
form
W i(xi; zi) = u(xi) + zi; xi =
4X
j=1
xij 8 i 2 fA;Bg; (1.1)
where xi is total consumption of good x in market i. We assume that the representative
consumers in the two countries are the owners of all rms and thus the claimants of
the residual prot income. Denoting the price of good x in country i by pi, the budget
constraint of the consumer in i is
pixi + zi = i + T i 8 i 2 fA;Bg; (1.2)
9This assumption simplies the calculations as rms treat the price in each market as an inde-
pendent variable. While price discrimination by rms is permitted, it will not occur in equilibrium as
markets are symmetric and trade costs are absent (see Brander, 1995, p. 1426).
10When the taxes in our model are interpreted as commodity taxes (excise taxes), these have the
character of production-based levies when they are imposed in the country of origin and cannot be
rebated upon export. This is true, for example, for many energy-related levies. When the tax t is
instead interpreted as a factor tax, our specication adopts the view - commonly held in the literature
- that capital income taxation follows the source principle. For an analysis that also incorporates
residence-based capital and dividend taxes in a setting with mergers, see Becker and Fuest (2009).
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wherei and T i are aggregate prot income and tax revenue in country i, respectively.11
The prots of each rm j are given by
j =
8<: pAxAj + pBxBj   (xAj + xBj )(r + tA) 8 j 2 f1; 2gpAxAj + pBxBj   (xAj + xBj )(r + tB) 8 j 2 f3; 4g : (1.3)
An important feature of our model is that the rms producing in country i may not be
fully owned by the local consumers. Specically, we denote by  the (exogenous) share
of each rm that is initially owned domestically, whereas (1   ) is the share owned
by the representative foreign consumer. We restrict  to be in the range 0:5    1,
thus ensuring that foreign owners do not hold a majority in any rm.12 To simplify
notation, we also assume that the domestic ownership share is the same for all rms,
i.e. residents of country A hold the share  in rms 1 and 2, whereas residents of
country B hold the same share  in rms 3 and 4.
Next, we characterize the behavior of national governments. Governments simul-
taneously and non-cooperatively choose the tax rate ti to maximize the utility of their
representative citizen. Tax policy in each country thus follows the national interest
only and international tax coordination is ruled out. If positive tax rates are chosen,
the resulting revenue T i is redistributed lump-sum to the representative consumer.
Conversely, if subsidies are paid to rms, then the costs of these subsidies are met by
a lump-sum tax on the domestic resident. Therefore the income of the representative
consumer in each country consists of the prot income derived from all rms and the
government balance. With quasi-linear utility, we can use the budget constraint (1.2)
to substitute out for zi in the utility function (1.1). National welfare in each country
thus equals the sum of consumer surplus, CSi = u(xi)   pixi, and the consumers
11We thus assume that all capital used in production is owned by residents from third, outside
countries. This is for notational simplicity only and implies no loss of generality. With positive
capital endowments, an additional xed source of income would be added to household income in A
and B, but this would a¤ect none of our results.
12There is substantial empirical evidence for such a home biasin the composition of shareholders
portfolios. See Pinkowitz et al. (2003) for a survey.
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income. Hence the governments of countries A and B solve:
max
tA
WA = CSA + 
2P
j=1
j + (1  )
4P
j=3
j + t
A
2P
j=1
xj ;
max
tB
WB = CSB + 
4P
j=3
j + (1  )
2P
j=1
j + t
B
4P
j=3
xj :
(1.4)
Prior to choosing their tax policy, governments decide on an exogenous national or
cross-border merger proposal.13 In case of a merger we take into account that mergers
create exogenous cost savings, which may di¤er for a national and an international
merger. We assume that these cost savings are known to both the merging rms and
the government. Hence governments base both their tax policy choices and the decision
on whether to permit a merger or not on the true, post-merger costs of production.
This sequence of events is motivated by the fact that the setting of sector-specic
taxes or subsidies is typically of a more short-term nature than the (usually irrevocable)
decision on a rm merger. Thus when deciding on a merger proposal governments
take into account the possibility to tax the prots in the more concentrated market.
As we will see below, this is particularly important when rms are partly owned by
foreigners. The timing of the game can thus be summarized as follows. In the rst
stage, a national or an international merger is proposed by the merging rms and
governments either reject or clear the proposal, depending on which policy maximizes
their national welfare.14 In the second stage, both governments non-cooperatively
set their tax policies. In the third stage, all rms simultaneously choose their prot
maximizing output levels.
In the following we rst analyze the output decisions by rms and the tax choices
of governments in the pre-merger case of double duopoly. The resulting allocation
and welfare under this market structure constitutes the benchmark against which the
outcome in alternative post-merger scenarios must be judged. We then proceed to study
outputs, tax levels, and welfare under a potential national or international merger,
13We use the terms international mergerand cross-border mergerinterchangeably.
14We assume that a national merger is decided upon by the country which hosts the merging rms,
whereas an international merger is cleared by a common regulation authority of the two countries.
These assumptions are not restrictive, however. It will be seen that a national merger in country A is
never vetoed by country B so that it is su¢ cient to concentrate on As decision. For an international
merger the equilibrium is symmetric and hence the interests of the two governments coincide.
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where only a single merger is permitted to occur in each analysis. E¤ectively we thus
assume that one of the rms in, say, country A is searching for a partner, which could
either be the national rival or one of the two rms operating in country B.15
1.3 Benchmark: Double duopoly
In this section we derive the optimal tax policies and the equilibrium allocation for
the benchmark case of double duopoly. Before we solve the model in closed form by
imposing additional restrictions on demand, it is useful to derive the optimal tax policy
in the more general framework outlined in section 2. This allows us to identify the dif-
ferent e¤ects that shape tax policy in the second stage of our model. Substituting (1.3)
in (1.4), di¤erentiating with respect to ti and employing the symmetry properties yields
for the example of country A (see the appendix for the derivation):
tA =
p0xijPB
i=A
P2
j=1(dx
i
j=dt
A)| {z }
(+)
266664
4X
j=1
dxAj
dtA| {z }
(I) ( )
+(2  1)
 
2X
j=1
dxBj
dtA
 
4X
j=3
dxBj
dtA
!
| {z }
(II) ( ;0)
+
4(1  )
( p0)| {z }
(III) (+;0)
377775 :
(1.5)
Here p0 < 0 is the slope of the inverse demand curve, xij is the supply of rm j to
market i (which is the same for all rms and in both markets) and dxi1=dt
A = dxi2=dt
A <
0 and dxi3=dt
A = dxi4=dt
A > 0 are the equilibrium changes of output for market i
produced by a representative rm located in country A and country B, respectively. To
sign the e¤ects in (1.5), note that a rise in tA reduces equilibrium output of country As
rms and increases that of Bs rms. Moreover, the e¤ect of the tax increase are
likely to be stronger in absolute terms for the rms in country A. Hence, for most
specications we would expect that jdxi1=dtAj = jdxi2=dtAj > jdxi3=dtAj = jdxi4=dtAj.
It is then straightforward to infer that the rst e¤ect (I) in equation (1.5) gives the
aggregate change in output supplied to country As consumers. This e¤ect, which we
label the e¢ ciency e¤ect, is negative, as an increase in tA reduces output of country As
15Studying simultaneous merger decisions is beyond the scope of the present analysis. See e.g.
Hauer and Nielsen (2008) for a partial analysis of both non-cooperative and cooperative merger
games in a setting without endogenous tax policy choices.
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rms by more than it increases the output ofBs rms. Since the consumption of good x
in country A is ine¢ ciently low, this e¤ect calls for subsidizing domestic production.
The second e¤ect (II) is a market share e¤ect. An increase in tA reduces the output of
country As rms and raises the output of Bs rms, thus redistributing prot income
towards the latter. This gives a strategic incentive to each country to subsidize domestic
rms (cf. Brander, 1995). The e¤ect is strongest with full national ownership ( = 1),
and it is absent if the ownership structure of rms is fully diversied internationally
( = 0:5). Finally, the third e¤ect (III) is a positive tax exporting e¤ect. It describes
the incentive to levy a positive tax on output whenever foreigners hold some share in
domestic rms ( < 1), as part of the tax burden will be shifted to them (cf. Huizinga
and Nielsen, 1997; Fuest, 2005). Overall, the sign of nationally optimal tax rates is
thus ambiguous in our analysis.
Having discussed the general e¤ects that shape tax policy in our model we now
introduce the assumption that utility is quadratic and hence U i = axi   (xi)2=2 + zi.
This utility function gives rise to linear inverse demands in each market:16
pi = a  xi 8 i: (1.6)
Solving the game by backward induction, we start with the solution of the rms
optimization problems. Maximizing prots in (1.3) with respect to xij, using the inverse
demand function (1.6) and employing the symmetry of the model yields
xi1 = x
i
2 =
 
a  r   3tA + 2tB

=5 8 i 2 fA;Bg;
xi3 = x
i
4 =
 
a  r   3tB + 2tA

=5 8 i 2 fA;Bg:
(1.7)
This shows that output levels of each rm depend negatively on the production-based
tax rate in the rms home country, but positively on the tax rate of the foreign country
(which hosts some of its rivals). Moreover, eq. (1.7) shows that jdx1=dtAj > jdx3=dtAj,
16This ensures that we can derive closed-form solutions for optimal tax rates and welfare in the
di¤erent cases. The latter is critical as we want to discretely compare the welfare levels in the double
duopoly benchmark and in each of the two merger scenarios.
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as postulated above. Substituting (1.7) into (1.3) gives maximized prots
1 = 2 =
2(a  r   3tA + 2tB)2
25
; 3 = 4 =
2(a  r   3tB + 2tA)2
25
: (1.8)
In the appendix we derive equilibrium tax rates as a function of the foreign ownership
share , solving the welfare maximization problem (1.4) in the second stage of the game.
To minimize the algebra in the main text, our analysis focuses on the polar cases of full
national ownership ( = 1), and full international ownership diversication ( = 0:5).
Since all expressions are monotonous in  in the relevant range, these polar cases
determine the bounds for endogenous tax rates and the implied welfare levels in the 
more realistic intermediate cases where 0:5 <  < 1.
1.3.1 National ownership of rms
With  = 1, the Nash equilibrium taxes [see (A.1) in the appendix] are
ti(DD)

=1
=
 (a  r)
4
8 i 2 fA;Bg: (1.9)
Hence, governments o¤er a production or capital subsidy to rms in order to raise
output towards its e¢ cient level. In fact, in the special case of full national ownership
of rms, the e¢ cient output level is reached and the resulting allocation represents a
global Pareto optimum (subscript PO). From (A.3) in the appendix, national welfare
in the two countries is
W i(DD)

=1
=
1
2
(a  r)2 = W iPO 8 i 2 fA;Bg: (1.10)
The result that non-cooperative tax policy yields an e¢ cient outcome when rms are
fully owned by the domestic resident is not obvious in our open economy setting. It
is, however, easily explained from (1.5). National governments do not fully internal-
ize the benets to consumers induced by a production subsidy because, with costless
international trade, some part of domestic production will be consumed by foreigners.
Therefore the e¢ ciency e¤ect (I) is reduced, relative to the case of a closed economy.
Merger policy and tax competition: the role of foreign o. 18
However, this incomplete incentive is o¤set by the strategic market share e¤ect (II).
In the special case of symmetric countries and zero trade costs, the market share e¤ect
exactly compensates for the reduced e¢ ciency incentive. Finally, for  = 1 the tax ex-
porting e¤ect (III) is absent. Hence in this case each country sets its non-cooperative
tax rate at the globally e¢ cient level.17
1.3.2 Internationally diversied ownership structure
With foreign rm ownership, two changes occur in equation (1.5). First, the incentive to
subsidize domestic rms through the market share e¤ect (II) is reduced. Furthermore,
each country now has an incentive to tax the prots of its domestic rms through the
tax exporting e¤ect (III), as prots now partly accrue to foreigners. From (A.1) in the
appendix, this leads to positive tax rates when the ownership structure of rms is fully
diversied
ti(DD)

=0:5
=
2(a  r)
17
> 0 8 i 2 fA;Bg: (1.11)
Moreover, the appendix [(A.3)] shows that welfare continuously falls in each country if
the foreign ownership share is increased (i.e., if  falls). For a fully diversied ownership
structure we get
W i(DD)

=0:5
=
132
289
(a  r)2 < W iPO 8 i 2 fA;Bg: (1.12)
Finally, we report the prots of each rm in the double duopoly equilibrium, given the
governmentstax choices for  = 1 and  = 0:5. From (A.2) these are given by
j(DD)

=1
=
(a  r)2
8
; j(DD)

=0:5
=
9(a  r)2
289
8 j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g: (1.13)
Hence prots of each rm fall when the foreign ownership share rises. This is due to
the higher taxes that each government levies, due to the tax exporting e¤ect.
17Recall that the quantities supplied to each market are well dened in our segmented markets
model (see footnote 9). The result that non-cooperative commodity taxation under the origin prin-
ciple yields a rst-best outcome is known from the previous tax literature (Keen and Lahiri, 1998,
Proposition 6; Hauer at el., 2005). This literature also shows that the result holds for more general
cost and demand functions, as long as the two countries are symmetric.
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Summarizing our results in this section gives:
Proposition 1 With symmetric countries and under a market structure of double
duopoly, non-cooperative tax policies by national governments achieve the rst best
if all rms are fully owned by domestic residents. An increase in the share of foreign
rm ownership raises tax rates in both countries above their Pareto e¢ cient levels and
reduces welfare in each country.
1.4 National merger
This section develops the implications of a national merger proposal in country A.
Firms 1 and 2 would thus merge to a new entity 12, which behaves as a single player.
A core motivation for rms to undertake mergers, and an important reason for regu-
lation authorities to permit them, is that mergers can create synergy e¤ects.18 In the
following we thus assume that a national merger between rms 1 and 2 reduces the
unit production costs by   0. This implies that the production function changes to
xj = kjr=(r ) and the unit costs of production before taxes fall to r . The merged
rm takes these lower costs into account when solving its maximization problem (1.3).
Governments set taxes so as to maximize national welfare, anticipating the optimal
output decision of rms.19 The appendix derives the resulting Nash equilibrium tax
rates for varying levels of the foreign ownership parameter [see eq. (A.9)]. As before,
our discussion focuses on the polar cases of  = 1 and  = 0:5.
1.4.1 National ownership of rms
For  = 1 the optimal tax rates in (A.9) reduce to
tA(NM)

=1
=  1
2
(a  r)  11
10
; tB(NM)

=1
=  1
4
(a  r)  3
20
: (1.14)
18Röller et al. (2001) distinguish between di¤erent sources of e¢ ciency gains following a merger such
as rationalization, economies of scale, technological progress, purchasing economies, and reduction of
slack. They also provide some empirical evidence of savings in variable cost associated with mergers.
19Market size must be su¢ ciently large in order to keep all rms in the market. In the benchmark
case of full national ownership, for example, we must assume that a > (9=5) + r.
Merger policy and tax competition: the role of foreign o. 20
Let us rst compare these tax rates to the double duopoly benchmark when there are
no cost savings of the merger ( = 0). It is then seen that the subsidy to domestic
production is doubled in country A, and remains unchanged in country B [cf. eq. (1.9)].
The reason for the change in country As tax policy is that both the e¢ ciency and the
market share e¤ect increase from the perspective of this country. This is explained as
follows. In the double duopoly benchmark, if country A grants a subsidy to one of its
rms, then not only the foreign rm in B but also the second rm in A will react with
a reduction of output under Cournot conjectures.20 This reduces the e¤ectiveness of
subsidies when a country hosts two (or more) rms. When the two rms merge, the
incentive to use subsidies is thus increased both in the home market (by the e¢ ciency
e¤ect) and in the foreign market (by the market share e¤ect). As a result of the
higher subsidy, production in country A will be the same before and after the merger
in this country. This implies in turn that the incentives for tax policy in country B are
una¤ected by the merger.
With positive cost savings  > 0, tax rates fall further in both countries (i.e.
subsidies rise), and this e¤ect is more pronounced in country A. This is because the
merged rm 12 can achieve a higher market share due to its cost advantage, beneting
the representative consumer in country A by generating larger total output and higher
prots. Hence the incentive for As government to subsidize the rms output rises
from both the market share and the e¢ ciency e¤ects. The higher subsidy granted by
country A in turn triggers a higher subsidy paid by country B to its local rms.
The resulting welfare levels for  = 1 are derived in the appendix and are given by
WA(NM)

=1
=
1
50

25(a  r)2 + 50(a  r) + 692

,
WB(NM)

=1
=
1
50

25(a  r)2 + 632

: (1.15)
Comparing these welfare levels to those obtained in the double duopoly equilibrium
[eq. (1.10)], we see that welfare levels are identical in both countries when cost savings
are absent. Hence, when rms are fully owned by domestic residents, non-cooperative
20In a similar setting, Huck and Konrad (2004) label the reduced e¤ectiveness of domestic subsidies
due to the output reduction of rivalling home rms a cannibalization e¤ect.
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tax policies will again be globally Pareto e¢ cient. At rst sight it is surprising that the
asymmetric scenario of a national merger in country A causes neither global e¢ ciency
losses nor redistributive e¤ects, even though equilibrium subsidy rates di¤er between
the two countries. As our above discussion has shown, however, the di¤erent subsidy
levels just o¤set the reduced number of rms in country A so that total production
in each country is unchanged in comparison to the benchmark setting. Moreover,
no redistributive e¤ects between countries arise because the higher subsidies paid by
country As government accrue entirely to domestic residents. Equation (1.15) further
shows that a fall in the unit production costs of the merged rm benets both countries.
Hence welfare in A and B strictly rises after the national merger, for any  > 0.
1.4.2 Internationally diversied ownership structure
When the ownership of rms is fully diversied ( = 0:5), equilibrium tax rates are [cf.
eq. (A.9) in the appendix]
tA(NM)

=0:5
=
3
28
(a  r) + 1
28
; tB(NM)

=0:5
=
9
56
(a  r) + 3
56
: (1.16)
We start again with  = 0. As in the double duopoly equilibrium, tax rates are posi-
tive for su¢ ciently high levels of foreign ownership because of the tax exporting e¤ect.
The basic trade-o¤ for each country is that the e¢ ciency and market share e¤ects call
for a domestic production subsidy, but this in turn causes an income transfer from
domestic taxpayers to the foreign owners of local rms. With a national merger in
country A, the trade-o¤ becomes more severe for this country because the incentive to
subsidize the merged rm is increased. In the Nash equilibrium, this leads to coun-
try A choosing a lower tax than country B. Equation (1.16) also shows that tax rates
rise still further when  > 0. This is in contrast to the sign that the cost savings
parameter  has in the optimal tax formulae when rms are fully owned by national
residents [eq. (1.14)]. Intuitively, the cost savings lead to higher production and raise
the incentives of governments to tax the corresponding prots accruing to foreigners.
National welfare in the case of full international ownership diversication is given
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WA(NM)

=0:5
=
1
1568

627(a  r)2 + 754(a  r) + 12272

WB(NM)

=0:5
=
1
1568

741(a  r)2 + 270(a  r) + 10532

: (1.17)
In the absence of any cost savings from the merger, the comparison with the double
duopoly benchmark [eq. (1.12)] shows that country A loses from the national merger
in its own country, whereas country B gains. As we have argued above, country A will
choose a lower tax in the Nash equilibrium as compared to country B. This implies
a redistribution of income from country A to country B because A taxes the foreign
owners of its rm less highly than does country B.
We are now prepared to discuss the conditions under which a national merger in
country A will be cleared by this countrys regulation authorities. Our comparison
of (1.17) and (1.12) has shown that country As government should reject the national
merger proposal in the absence of cost savings. Cost reductions caused by the merger
will, however, increase both output and prots in country A and hence unambiguously
benet the representative consumer in this country. Hence there must be a critical
value of cost savings above which the national merger is in the national interest of
country A. For  = 0:5 this critical cost reduction is  = 0:1015(a  r).
Finally, we have to discuss whether the merging rms also have an incentive to
propose the national merger. The prots of the merged rm 12 are derived in the
appendix as
12j=1 =
1
2
(a  r + 2)2 ; 12j=0:5 =
1
8
(a  r + 3)2 : (1.18)
Comparing (1.18) with (1.13) shows that the prots of the merged rm (12) exceed
the sum of prots of rms 1 and 2 for either  = 1 or  = 0:5, even if cost savings are
absent ( = 0). This result is in sharp contrast to the well known analysis of Salant
et al. (1983) who show that the formation of a merger is not privately protable for
the merging rms in a standard Cournot game with linear demands, unless the merged
rm realizes a market share of at least 80 per cent. Here the merger is privately
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protable, even though the merged rm controls a market share of only 50%. This is
due to the increased output subsidy paid by country A in response to the change in
market structure caused by the national merger.21 Since prots are further rising in ,
a national merger will thus always be proposed by the merging rms. Our results for
the national merger are summarized in:
Proposition 2 (i) When all rms are fully owned by domestic residents ( = 1), the
national merger benets both the merging rms and the representative consumer in
country A for any positive level of cost savings.
(ii) When rm ownership is fully diversied internationally ( = 0:5), then national
welfare will only be increased by a national merger when cost savings exceed a critical
threshold of   0:1015(a  r).
1.5 Cross-border merger
We now consider an exogenous cross-border merger proposal between rm 1 in country
A and rm 3 in country B. The international merger is associated with an exogenous
unit cost reduction of s  0. Due to the symmetric distribution of ownership shares, the
merged entity 13 will be owned equally by the representative consumers of each state
for all levels of . Hence, a cross-border merger increases the regional diversication
of rm ownership whenever  > 0:5 holds strictly in the pre-merger situation.
We assume that the merged rm divides its production between the two countries.
This assumption can be motivated by the presence of restructuring costs, which the
merged rm would face if it closed down one production plant entirely.22 Moreover,
maintaining a production base in each country allows the rm to serve each market by
local production. We thus assume that each plant owned by the merged rm serves the
customers in the respective country only. Even though our model does not incorporate
21It is easily checked that, in the absence of taxes, positive cost savings are also needed for the
national merger to be privately protable in the present setting. These can be calculated from (1.8)
and (A.5) in the appendix (setting tA = tB = 0), yielding a critical value of   0:0438(a  r).
22From a theoretical perspective, xing the decision of the merged rm of where to produce avoids
tax competition between the two countries for a rm that would otherwise be mobile internationally
(cf. footnote 8). This makes the analysis of the cross-border merger comparable to the double duopoly
and national merger scenarios, where the location of rms is also xed.
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transport costs, we can think of small unit costs for shipping goods abroad, which
break the indi¤erence of rm 13 as to which customers to serve from each production
unit.23
The maximization problems of the three rms j 2 f13; 2; 4g in the last stage of the
game are similar in structure to eq. (1.3), but the problem of rm 13 must account
for the fact that taxes continue to be paid in the country of production and hence
di¤erent parts of its output are taxed in di¤erent countries. The equilibrium values for
outputs, prots and consumer surplus, and the resulting welfare maximization problems
of governments are found in the appendix.
1.5.1 National ownership of non-merged rms
With full domestic ownership of all non-merged rms ( = 1) the symmetric equilib-
rium tax rates derived in the appendix [eq. (A.13)] are
tA(IM)

=1
= tB(IM)

=1
=   5
23
(a  r) + 9
23
s : (1.19)
Hence both countries grant an ine¢ ciently low subsidy in this case, relative to the
double duopoly benchmark. The main reason for this nding is that a tax exporting
e¤ect is now also present for  = 1. While all rms are domestically owned prior
to the merger, the ownership of the merged rm is shared between residents of coun-
tries A and B. This creates an incentive in both countries to increase taxes above
their Pareto e¢ cient levels.24 Equation (1.19) shows that this tax exporting motive is
even strengthened when the internationally merged rm commands of cost advantages
relative to its national competitors, and hence captures larger market shares.
These taxes result in the following welfare levels for each country (see the appendix)
WA(IM) = W
B
(IM)

=1
=
1
1058

525(a  r)2 + 318(a  r)s+ 689s2

: (1.20)
23The argument that cross-border mergers lead to savings in transport costs is stressed in the
existing literature. See e.g. Horn and Persson (2001), or Südekum (2008).
24Note that the e¢ cient post-merger tax would even be lower (the subsidy would be higher) than
in the double duopoly benchmark, due to increased market concentration.
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In the absence of cost savings (s = 0), welfare in each country is now lower than in the
Pareto e¢ cient double duopoly benchmark. This is of course due to the governments
strategic tax exporting motive discussed above. However, synergy e¤ects will benet
consumers in each country. From (A.3) and (1.20) we nd that welfare in the interna-
tional merger equilibrium will reach the benchmark level under double duopoly when
s  0:0123(a  r).
1.5.2 International ownership of non-merged rms
When the ownership shares of non-merging rms are also fully diversied, Nash equi-
librium tax rates after the international merger are [see eq. (A.13)]
tA(IM)

=0:5
= tB(IM)

=0:5
=
3
31
(a  r) + 1
31
s: (1.21)
Focusing on the case without cost savings (s = 0), these tax rates are again positive,
but they are lower than in the double duopoly benchmark (cf. (1.11)). Moreover, a
comparison with eq. (1.16) shows that taxes in both countries are lower after the cross-
border merger, as compared to the national merger. Since we know that tax rates are
above their Pareto e¢ cient levels in the presence of foreign rm ownership, this implies
that global welfare must also be higher for the international merger. Moreover, taxes
rise less strongly in response to cost savings than is true under the national merger.
To explain these results, observe rst that the prots of all rms are equally shared
between residents from A and B. Hence the tax exporting e¤ect is equally strong
in the national and international merger scenarios when  = 0:5. Moreover, with
equally shared ownership of all rms, the market share e¤ect is absent [see eq. (1.5)].
Hence any tax di¤erences in the two scenarios must be driven by the e¢ ciency e¤ect.
This e¤ect will be the stronger the larger is the part of domestic consumption that
is also produced domestically (as governments ultimately aim at increasing domestic
consumption, but can only subsidize production). This share is higher under the cross-
border merger, as compared to the national merger, when the merged rm 13 maintains
production in both countries and thus produces its output in countries A and B for the
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respective local consumers only. In other words, the e¤ect of the international merger
between rms 1 and 3 is to substitute local production for the exports that these rms
undertook in the pre-merger equilibrium. This aligns the tax incentives of governments
more closely with the requirements of Pareto optimality and lowers tax rates in both
countries.
National welfare after the cross-border merger is given by (see the appendix)
WA(IM) = W
B
(IM)

=0:5
=
1
1922

861(a  r)2 + 574(a  r)s+ 1377s2

: (1.22)
Comparing (1.22) to the corresponding value in the double duopoly benchmark
[eq. (1.12)] shows that national welfare after the international merger falls below the
welfare in the double duopoly benchmark when s = 0. This is because the lower equi-
librium tax rates in the international merger scenario are insu¢ cient to compensate
consumers for the reduced number of competing rms. On the other hand, cost sav-
ings again have a direct, positive e¤ect on welfare in both countries. For  = 0:5, the
critical cost savings of the international merger that make the resident of each country
equally well o¤ as compared to the double duopoly case are s  0:0273(a   r). This
threshold is lower than the corresponding value in the national merger scenario, due
to the more e¢ cient tax choices of governments.
Finally, we have to evaluate the incentive of rms to engage in a cross-border merger.
The prots of the merging rm 13 are derived in the appendix and are given by
13j=1 =
1
8

532(a  r) + 1140s
437
2
; 13j=0:5 =
1
8

756(a  r) + 2484s
837
2
: (1.23)
Comparing these values with the pre-merger prots in eq. (1.13) shows that the inter-
national merger will not be protable for the merging rms unless there are noticeable
cost savings. One reason is again that countries will tax all rms more severely when
an international merger raises the foreign ownership share of domestic rms. This
di¤erence to the double duopoly case is most pronounced when all rms were nation-
ally owned prior to the international merger. Hence the critical value of cost savings
that makes rms willing to engage in an international merger is s  0:0754(a  r) for
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 = 1, but only s  0:0320(a   r) for  = 0:5.25 Both of these values are higher
than the cost savings required by regulation authorities. Therefore, the incentives of
the merging rms are now the binding constraint for an international merger to be
enacted. This contrasts with the national merger case and results from the fact that
the merging parties do not benet from a more favorable tax environment, relative to
their competitors, in the international merger scenario. Importantly for our ensuing
analysis, it remains true that, for  = 0:5, the binding threshold value of cost savings
is lower for the cross-border merger, as compared to the national merger. Our results
are summarized in:
Proposition 3 A cross-border merger will benet the merging rms only if it delivers
strictly positive cost savings. The critical value of cost savings is lower the more rm
ownership is diversied in the initial equilibrium and given by (i) s  0:0754 when all
rms are fully owned by domestic residents ( = 1); and (ii) s  0:0320(a   r) when
rm ownership is fully diversied internationally ( = 0:5).
1.6 When does each type of merger occur?
Having described the national and international merger scenarios in isolation, it is
straightforward to infer under which conditions one or the other type of merger is more
likely to occur. For this comparison we make the critical assumption that cost savings
are the same in the two scenarios, i.e.  = s. Table 1.1 summarizes the critical values
of cost savings needed for (i) merging rms to propose the merger and (ii) governments
to clear it, for each of the di¤erent types of merger and for di¤erent values of the initial
foreign ownership share .
25In the absence of taxes, the critical cost savings needed for the merger to be protable for the
merging rms are the same as in the national merger case and equal s  0:0438(a r) (cf. footnote 21).
This value lies in between the two critical values with taxes and polar assumptions about .
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Table 1.1: Critical values of cost savings in di¤erent merger scenarios
National merger  = 1  = 0:5
(i) merging rms 0 0
(ii) governments 0 0:1015(a  r)
binding value 0 0:1015(a  r)
Cross-border merger  = 1  = 0:5
(i) merging rms 0:0754(a  r) 0:0320(a  r)
(ii) governments 0:0123(a  r) 0:0273(a  r)
binding value 0:0754(a  r) 0:0320(a  r)
From Table 1.1 we then immediately arrive at:
Proposition 4 In comparison to a national merger, a cross-border merger (i) requires
higher cost savings to be proposed and cleared when there is full national ownership in
the pre-merger equilibrium ( = 1); (ii) requires lower cost savings to be proposed and
cleared when the pre-merger equilibrium is characterized by full international ownership
diversication ( = 0:5).
With full domestic ownership of rms ( = 1) the national merger is the preferred
alternative, as any positive level of cost savings will ensure that the merger benets
all the parties involved. In contrast the international merger will cause overtaxation of
prots due to a tax exporting e¤ect. With full international ownership diversication
( = 0:5), however, this result is reversed. The critical value of cost savings at which
the national merger will be proposed and cleared is now higher than under the cross-
border merger. There are two reasons for this. First, the tax exporting e¤ect is now
equally strong in the two merger scenarios and no longer constitutes a disadvantage for
the international merger. Second, the e¢ ciency e¤ect is stronger in the international
merger case, because a higher share of consumption in each country is also produced
locally and subsidies can be targeted more e¤ectively. Hence taxes in both countries
will be lower and closer to their e¢ cient levels, as compared to the national merger.
Our ndings are graphically summarized in Figure 1.1. The gure shows that
if cost savings are small (and  is substantially less than 1), neither a national nor
an international merger will simultaneously benet the merging rms and the host
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium market structure with at most one merger
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country. Hence a double duopoly situation is the equilibrium outcome in this case.26
Conversely, for very high levels of  = s, either the national or the international merger
will be proposed and cleared. The interesting cases lie in between. For high levels of
 there is an intermediate range of cost savings for which the national merger, but
not the international merger, is simultaneously protable for the merging rms and for
country As government. For low levels of  there is instead a range of cost savings
where the international merger is proposed and cleared, whereas the national merger
is blocked by the host countrys regulation authority. Our detailed intuitive discussion
of the relevant e¤ects in the previous sections suggests that the qualitative pattern of
results shown in Figure 1.1 should carry over to more general settings (for example,
with respect to the specications of utility and cost functions), although the exact
location of the di¤erent areas in the gure will of course change.
Finally we briey discuss how the size of the di¤erent areas in Figure 1.1 will be
a¤ected when some of the model assumptions are relaxed. A rst relevant extension
is to introduce trade costs between countries A and B. This implies that the output
of each rm is larger for the domestic than for the foreign market in the initial double
duopoly equilibrium. Moreover, a cross-border merger eliminates trade costs for the
26Note that the term equilibriumhas a narrow meaning in our analysis, as at most one merger
can occur.
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merging rm and thus adds a second element of e¢ ciency gains, in addition to the
reduction of unit production costs. Other things being equal, this will make it more
protable for rms to propose a cross-border merger, leading to a downward shift of
the downward sloping curve in Figure 1.1. As a result the parameter range where a
cross-border merger is the equilibrium market structure would be enlarged.
Another possible extension is to relax the assumption that governments have lump-
sum tax instruments at their disposal and assume instead that the shadow price of
public funds is exogenously xed at a value in excess of unity. In this case optimal
taxes will generally be higher than in our benchmark case, as the value of positive tax
revenues is increased. Since a merger increases market concentration and accordingly
calls for higher subsidies on account of the e¢ ciency e¤ect, an increase in the shadow
cost of public funds will make it less likely for governments to clear a merger proposal.
However, the governments willingness to clear the merger is the binding constraint
only in the case of a national merger (cf. Table 1.1). Therefore, the only rst-order
e¤ect in this case is to shift the upward sloping line in Figure 1.1 to the left. Hence this
extension would also increase the parameter range for which the cross-border merger
is the equilibrium market structure.
1.7 Conclusions
In many industries governments have sector-specic tax and regulation policies at their
disposal to inuence the market outcome after a change in market structure has oc-
curred. In this paper we have set up a simple model to analyze the incentives for
nationally optimal tax policies in response to a national merger on the one hand, and
to a cross-border merger on the other. Whether these di¤erent tax responses favor
a national or an international merger depends crucially on the share of foreign rm
ownership in the pre-merger situation. If all rms are locally owned initially, then the
national merger leads to e¢ cient tax policy choices and requires fewer cost savings,
in comparison to the cross-border merger, in order to be enacted. In contrast, if the
share of foreign rm ownership is large initially, then the international merger will be
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proposed and cleared for a wider range of cost savings.
Our model thus implies that a rise in international portfolio diversication will
raise the likelihood of cross-border mergers, other things being equal. This pattern
is compatible with some of the examples mentioned in the introduction. The French
rm Alstom, whose international takeover was blocked by the French authorities, has
a high share of national ownership until today, with French shareholders possessing
54% of Alstoms capital in 2009. This is at least partly in contrast to the ownership
structures of the German rm RWE where foreign institutional shareholders were the
dominant group in 2009, comprising 64% of all institutional shareholders. By the
time RWE acquired the British energy company Innogy in 2002, its ownership had
already diversied substantially and the same was true for the British target rm,
which was almost exclusively owned by private individuals at the time of the takeover.
Overall, these examples t the implication of our model that a large share of foreign
asset holdings promotes international instead of national mergers. Our argument is
complementary to other reasons for cross-border mergers, in particular the possibility
to save on aggregate transport costs.
The ndings in this paper hold the testable empirical implication that we should
observe a positive relationship between the foreign ownership share and the share of
cross-border mergers in a particular industry. There is indeed some rst, suggestive ev-
idence in support of this proposition. In the OECD countries the share of cross-border
mergers in the total number of M&A cases di¤ers widely across di¤erent economic
sectors and is highest in manufacturing (about 35%; see Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001,
Table 1). At the same time, manufacturing is also one of the most internationalized
sectors with respect to foreign ownership, at least in European countries (about 25%;
see Denis et al., 2005, Figure 4.2). Similarly, there are sectors with a low share of for-
eign rm ownership, such as construction, where the share of cross-border mergers in
the total number ofM&A cases is also low. A detailed empirical study would be needed
to rigorously test whether this positive relationship between foreign ownership and the
share of cross-border mergers holds more generally, and whether tax and regulatory
policies play an important role in this process.
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Our theoretical analysis could be extended in several directions. One possibility
would be to endogenize the share of foreign rm ownership, and relate this share ex-
plicitly to the forces of economic integration. In such a setting international portfolio
diversication would lead to gains in the form of higher returns or lower aggregate risk,
but it would also cause higher information or transaction costs. If economic integration
reduces the latter, the link between globalization and the rise of cross-border merg-
ers could be explicitly modeled. Another extension would be to consider endogenous
merger equilibria, which treat mergers as a cooperative game of coalition formation.
These extensions could also be combined to study how increasing economic integration
a¤ects the equilibrium ownership structure of rms when the optimal adjustment of
tax policies is simultaneously taken into account.
Chapter 2
Merger policy and tax competition:
the role of trade costs
2.1 Introduction
Trade barriers still play an important role in international markets although there have
been serious attempts to lower them over the last decades. In fact, trade liberalisation
on a worldwide level has taken place especially within the scope of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) based on the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT).
Nevertheless, the last attempt to overcome existing trade barriers and to lower persist-
ing tari¤s in the so called Doha Development Agenda has not been successful so far.
This is noteworthy as the failure to nalise the Doha Development Agenda in 2008
has prohibited a signicant increase of trade volume and trade cost savings27. Con-
versely, trade costs can still play a signicant role in rmsdecision making although
unit transportation costs have become very low for most products28. Moreover, trade
barriers as a potentially important amount of trade costs are often prevalent in sectors
with concentrated industries, e.g. in the aerospace industry.
I will deal in this chapter with trade costs in concentrated industries where rms
27Global income gains might be around 160 billions of US dollars if the proposals of the Agenda
were implemented, compare estimates of the worldbank e.g. Hoekman et al (2009).
28Anderson and Wincoop (2004) survey the measurement of trade costs and show that they are
still highly relevant despite of the trend to globalisation: the ad valorem tax equivalent often exceeds
100%.
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might consider cross-border merging activities. The value of cross-border mergers and
acquisitions has seen an enormous increase over the last decades reaching about one
trillion US dollars in the record year 2007 (see UNCTAD World Investment Report
2009, annex table B.4). In some countries there are even more international mergers
and acquisitions than domestic deals29. One motivation to engage in international
mergers and acquisitions can be the implied ability to serve foreign markets directly
without any trade costs if merged rms produce in each market. I will consider in this
chapter horizontal mergers where this inherent tari¤ jumping argument (and trade
costs in general) has to be considered.
Merger proposals in concentrated industries must be regularly cleared by (in-
ter)national competition authorities or governments that are, at least ideally, inter-
ested in maximizing (inter-)national welfare. Moreover, national governments often
have another instrument at their disposal: they can adjust their sector specic taxes or
subsidies to new market structures. More generally, sector specic tax or subsidy poli-
cies might also be implemented by more or less severe regulation policies that exist, for
example, in most network industries. This contribution raises the question how welfare
and prots are a¤ected by a cross-border merger if national governments indeed use
these two instruments, merger control and sector specic taxes. The main focus lies
on the specic role of trade costs with respect to the welfare maximizing behaviour of
national governments and on the incentives of rms to pursue a cross-border merger.
Therefore I introduce a simple model of Cournot-competition on two segmented and
symmetric markets with two producing rms in each market. Essentially there is costly
trade between these markets. I apply a three stage game where governments decide on
a proposed merger on the rst stage. On the second stage governments choose national
welfare maximizing tax rates anticipating the nal output decisions of the rms. This
order of the game can be motivated by the long-term implications of mergers whereas
tax rates or regulation policies can often be adjusted in the short-term. Finally, the
chapter shows that governments choose lower tax rates as soon as trade costs shrink.
The main reason is that lower trade costs make it more attractive to generate market
shares abroad which can be favorised by lower taxes or even higher subsidies. This
29See e.g. Rossi and Volpin (2004), table 1.
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even leads to the potential implementation of the rst best in concentrated industries
if there are no trade costs (and no costs of taxation). Conversely, governments have an
incentive for overtaxation if there are positive trade costs. Comparing the pre-merger
to the post-merger situation, we will see that there is a higher incentive for overtaxation
if a cross border merger has taken place which, in turn, renders international merger
proposals unprotable from the perspective of the merging rms in this simplied
model. With respect to the nal decision on a merger proposal, it will be shown that
mergers which become privately protable due to additional synergies would also be
welfare increasing.
The presented model is closely related to Hauer/Schulte (2009) who have also
investigated the interactions between merger policy and tax competition. The distin-
guishing feature of the contribution at hand is the introduction of trade costs between
countries30. Moreover, it is related to several strands of the literature. First, there
is a literature on strategic merger policy in open economies. Examples are Huck and
Konrad (2004), Saggi and Yildiz (2006) and Südekum (2008) who all discuss the inter-
relation between competition and trade policy but not with tax policies. Other papers
focus on the impact of trade costs on rmsprots and merging decisions but again
without consideration of tax policies: Hijzen et al. (2008) for example show, using
OECD data from 1990-2001, that the impact of trade costs on cross-border mergers
is negative which might be due to obstructive trade barriers. Nevertheless this ef-
fect is less negative for horizontal mergers which is consistent with the tari¤-jumping
argument. Finally, my paper builds on optimal commodity taxation in concentrated
industries. An early contribution of this literature is Keen and Lahiri (1998) who are
among the rst authors focussing on oligopolistic industries in this context31.
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 introduces the model by distinguish-
ing between the benchmark scenario in the pre-merger situation and the cross-border
scenario in the post-merger situation. The results of the model are left to section 2.3.
Open issues are discussed in section 2.4. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 2.5.
30Hauer and Schulte (2009) have focused on rm ownership with respect to their international
diversication.
31More recent papers are Hauer et al. (2005) and Hashimzade et al. (2005).
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2.2 Model
In this section I will present the theoretical framework which enables us to analyse the
attractiveness of mergers and their welfare e¤ects in the context of tax competition
under the special emphasis of existing trade costs between countries.
Before specifying the analytical assumptions, I start with dening the timing of the
game used in the model. The game structure is in line with the analysis in Hauer
and Schulte (2009)32. In the rst stage, rms decide if they want to pursue a merger,
especially an international one. Depending on its welfare implications, regulation au-
thorities may accept or deny such a merger proposal. In the next stage, governments
non-cooperatively set production based tax rates. These taxes will be unit taxes on
production and thereby a¤ect the output decisions of the prot maximizing rms on
the last stage of the game.
I start with the benchmark case that describes the pre-merger situation in an oligopolis-
tic industry of four rms which are operating in two countries.
2.2.1 Benchmark without cross-border merger
Consider two symmetric countries A and B with two rms located in each country.
These rms are producing a homogenous good, for example electricity. It is sold in both
markets whereby each rm maximizes its prot independently in each market33. Firms
are facing a constant production cost r which is resulting of the normalization that each
rm is able to produce one unit of output by using one unit of capital34. Moreover they
have to bear a sector specic unit tax of production, which is levied due to the origin
principle of taxation. Taxation in the country of production is relevant if we consider
prot taxes or subsidies that are targeted directly at local producers. In contrast to HS,
who are dealing with a similar setting, I add transport costs of k per unit of production
that is delivered to the respective foreign market35. The focus in this chapter will be
32I refer to Hauer and Schulte (2008) by denoting HS in the following.
33Therefore markets are assumed to be segmented. This is often plausible in formerly unprivatised
sectors (as in the energy sector) because some national structures are still prevailing there.
34Capital is available at the exogenous world interest rate r.
35Note that there will be two-way trade of the homogenous good due to reciprocal dumping, see
Brander and Krugman (1983).
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on the analysis of the resulting implications due to these transport costs which can,
generally spoken, be interpreted as a parameter of international integration. On the
demand side I assume a quadratic, quasi linear utility U of the representative consumer
such that income e¤ects are only present with respect to an additional numeraire
good z. This generates a linear inverse demand constituting a manageable analytical
workhorse model.
Let us assume that rms 1 and 2 are producing in A and rms 3 and 4 are producing
in B. I denote production of rm i for market A as xi and for market B as yi. Formally
I have UA(x; z) = u(x) + z with x =
Pi=4
i=1 xi in country A and UB(y; z) = u(y) + z
with
Pi=4
i=1 yi in country B. This leads to the linear inverse demand pA = a   x and
pB = a  y.
The model is solved by backward induction. Therefore I start by considering the
prot maximization problems of the four rms in the last stage of the game. Beside
the original production cost r, rms have to bear the tax rate t levied on every unit of
production in the producing country and trade costs k if the produced unit has to be
delivered to the foreign market. Therefore I get the following total production cost ci:
ci = xi(r + tA) + yi(r + tA + k) 8 i 2 f1; 2g (2.1)
ci = xi(r + tB + k) + yi(r + tB) 8 i 2 f3; 4g
This leads immediately to the prot maximizing problems of the rms:
max
xi;yi
i =
 
a 
i=4X
i=1
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!
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a 
i=4X
i=1
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!
yi   xi (r + tA)  yi (r + tA + k) (2.2)
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8 i 2 f3; 4g
I assume to have segmented markets in A and B which is at least plausible in some
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industries under consideration36. Thereby rms will optimize their output decisions
separately with respect to the two markets. Following this, I get the Nash equilibrium
quantities for country A which are symmetric in country B:
xi =
1
5
(a  r) + 2
5
k   3
5
tA +
2
5
tB 8 i 2 f1; 2g (2.3)
xi =
1
5
(a  r)  3
5
k +
2
5
tA  
3
5
tB 8 i 2 f3; 4g
x 
X
xi =
4
5
(a  r)  2
5
(k + tA + tB)
The implied price level, prots and consumer surplus of both countries are found in
the appendix. Governments in A and B seek to maximize social welfare W consisting
of consumer surplus (CS)37, prots of domestic rms and tax revenue by choosing an
optimal production tax (or subsidy). They are faced with the following optimization
problem:
max
tA
WA = CSA + 1 + 2 + tA (x1 + x2 + y1 + y2) (2.4)
max
tB
WB = CSB + 3 + 4 + tB (x3 + x4 + y3 + y4)
The resulting optimal tax rates and its implications on prots and welfare of this
benchmark scenario will be discussed in the next section. They will be compared to
the results of an international merger scenario to which I turn now.
2.2.2 Cross-border merger
Lets assume that two rms (rms 1 and 3) perform an international merger building
the new entity f . The merged rm may produce in both countries or shut down
one production facility. This decision will depend on the corresponding impact on
prots38. Therefore we have to compare the resulting unit cost of production in both
countries. Considering the o¤er in the segmented market A, rm f wants to produce
36Thereby, due to the symmetry of the model, price discrimination does not occur in equilibrium.
37CSA = CSB =
1
2 (a  x)x
38This is in contrast to HS who do not allow the international merged rm to choose their production
facility.
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the respective quantity in country A if the unit tax rate in this country is smaller than
the unit tax rate in B plus additional unit trade costs k. Therefore, f produces in A
for A if tA < tB + k holds.
Analogously, production for market B of the international merged rm takes place in
country B if the condition tB < tA+ k is satised. If these conditions for home-market
production are fullled simultaneously, the prot maximizing problem of the rms can
be stated as follows :
max
xf ;yf
f = (a  xf   x2   x4)xf   xf (r + tA) (2.5)
+(a  (yf + y2 + y4) yf   yf (r + tA)
max
x2;y2
2 = (a  xf   x2   x4)x2   x2 (r + tA)
+ (a  (yf + y2 + y4)) y2   y2(r + tA + k)
max
x4;y4
4 = (a  xf   x2   x4)x4   x4 (r + tB + k)
+ (a  (yf + y2 + y4)) y4   y4 (r + tB)
Again, rms will optimize their output decisions separately with respect to both mar-
kets as they are assumed to be segmented. The resulting quantities are dependant on
transport costs and on tax rates at home and abroad. Thereby, home market produc-
tion is increasing with transport costs which generates an advantage for the merged rm
as it is the only one producing in both countries. As expected, production is negatively
a¤ected by the local tax rate and positively a¤ected by the foreign tax rate. These
quantities are as follows with respect to market A (market B is again symmetric):
x2 = xf =
1
4
(a  r) + 1
4
k   1
2
tA +
1
4
tB (2.6)
x4 =
1
4
(a  r)  3
4
k +
1
2
tA  
3
4
tB
x =
3
4
(a  r)  1
4
k   1
2
tA  
1
4
tB
The resulting prices, prots and consumer surplus can be found in the appendix again.
Anticipating rms behaviour, governments of country A and B execute a non-
cooperative tax competition game by choosing the tax rate that maximizes national
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welfare:
max
tA
WA = CSA +
1
2
13 + 2 + tA(xf + x2 + y2) (2.7)
max
tB
WB = CSB +
1
2
13 + 4 + tB(yf + y4 + x4)
It can be shown that the only potential equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium with
production of the merged rm in both countries for the respective home market (see
appendix). Thereby, governments must be faced with su¢ cient high trade costs such
that there is no incentive to lower the tax rate in order to attract the mobile merged
rm or to lower a subsidy in order to loose that rm. Therefore, trade costs must be
assumed to be at least
k  4
1861
(a  r)

23
p
2626  1122

 d : (2.8)
The nal results of the non cooperative tax competition game and its implications
on optimal rmsbehavior will be discussed in the following section.
2.3 Results
Again, lets start with the benchmark scenario without a merger in order to compare
the results to the international merger scenario later on.
2.3.1 Benchmark without cross-border merger
In the benchmark scenario of two rms located in each country (double duopoly, DD),
the nal optimal tax rates, solving (2.4) are
tA(DD) = t
B
(DD =  
1
4
(a  r) + 1
8
k : (2.9)
There are two e¤ects at work calling for an optimal subsidy in this symmetric
oligopoly such that the Pareto optimal quantity would be produced in the absence
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of trade costs. On the one hand governments seek to maximize domestic consumer
surplus by incentivising rms to produce as much as they would produce under perfect
competition (e¢ ciency e¤ect): this incentive is limited in an open economy by the fact
that governments do not internalize benets accruing to foreigners buying subsidized
products. On the other hand this limitation is counteracted by a market share e¤ect
describing the incentive for governments to generate relatively high market shares of
domestic rms in the foreign market in order to increase their prots at the expense
of foreign rms. The overall resulting Pareto-optimal quantity is identically to the one
shown by HS if there were no trade costs39. Considering positive trade costs in this
example of linear demand, these incentives do not lead to a Pareto optimal tax rate any
longer. Obviously, trade costs give a cost advantage for local rms generating higher
market shares for these rms. The increased home-market production is stimulating
higher subsidies as a higher share of their benets remains in the granting country
now. Technically, one can show that the e¢ ciency e¤ect calling for higher subsidies is
indeed increasing with k by introducing foreign ownership of rms. Assuming rms to
be owned equally by domestic and foreign residents, there is no market share incentive
for granting subsidies as prots are shared equally between countries anyway. In this
case, the equilibrium tax rate becomes a decreasing function of trade costs k:
t = 2
17
(a   r)   1
17
k40: Nevertheless, this increased e¢ ciency e¤ect is dominated by a
decreased market share incentive such that there is the positive impact of k on t shown
in equation (2.9). This is again explained by the competitive disadvantage of domestic
rms in the foreign market due to trade costs: thereby subsidies, granted to generate
higher market shares abroad, become less e¤ective if trade costs increase inducing a
lower trade volume. Essentially, higher subsidies would have a lower impact on prots
earned by additional units sold in the foreign market (and therefore on social welfare) if
exporting rms have to bear higher trade costs. The dominant market share e¤ect can
also be seen in the prot maximizing quantities [see eq. (2.3)] showing that quantities
sold abroad decrease linearly with higher trade costs. This is only partly o¤set by a
39Compare HS, section 3. Moreover, Hauer et al. (2005), who compare di¤erent tax regimes, refer
to this result of Pareto Optimality on page 290f.
40Moreover, the equilibrium tax rate has increased for a given level of k because there is an addi-
tional incentive to tax prots accruing to foreigners.
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higher quantity produced in the home market41. These ndings can be summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 5 National welfare maximizing governments choose higher production
tax rates in the Nash equilibrium if trade costs increase. This tax rate is not Pareto-
optimal in contrast to a situation without trade costs.
Lets also have a closer look on the resulting equilibrium prots of the symmetric
rms. This equilibrium can be computed by inserting (2.9) in (2.3):
x1 = x2 = y3 = y4 =
1
4
(a  r) + 3
8
k (2.10)
x3 = x4 = y1 = y2 =
1
4
(a  r)  5
8
k
x = y = a  r   1
2
k (2.11)
This leads to equilibrium prots by inserting these results in the respective prot
equations in the appendix:
j(DD) =
1
8

a  r   1
2
k
2
+
1
2
k2 8 j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g (2.12)
It can be seen that prots decrease for low levels of k but will increase for high
levels of k again42. This is explained by the parabolic form of total trade costs: they
reach their maximum for intermediate levels of k as there is already a noticeable level of
unit trade costs together with a still considerable trade volume. When k becomes even
higher, these higher unit costs are mitigated by a lower trade level leading to shrinking
total trade costs. This trade-o¤is not changed fundamentally by governments which are
imposing higher tax rates whenever k increases because the implied tax change follows
a linear pattern [see eq. (2.9)]. Moreover, there is a benecial e¤ect of increasing unit
trade costs from the perspective of prot maximizing rms: an increase in k leads to
a lower degree of competition which implies a decrease of total o¤er [see eq. (2.11)]
41Moreover, quantities must be nonnegative for a valid analysis. This is ensured if trade costs do
not exceed k = 25 (a  r):
42Recalling the maximum level of k for positive trade, the overall e¤ect of trade costs will never be
positive compared to a situation without trade costs.
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and a price above marginal costs, p = r + 1
2
k. In sum, rmsprots are minimized if
k = 2
17
(a   r). Prots increase for higher levels of trade costs again without reaching
the level without any trade costs at the maximum level of k for positive trade.
Finally, optimal national tax policies imply the following equilibrium welfare levels
by inserting the results above in (2.4):
WA(DD) = W
B
(DD) =
1
2
(a  r)2   1
2
(a  r) k + 9
8
k2 (2.13)
If trade costs were absent, welfare reaches the rst best level implied by the Pareto-
optimal tax rates of (2.9) inducing quantities as under perfect competition. Considering
trade costs, equilibrium welfare reects the changes of prots described above as well
as changes in consumer surplus (see appendix) and tax revenue. Not surprisingly,
consumer surplus must decrease for all allowed positive values of k because rms benet
from an increased monopolistic power implying higher prices. Therefore the equilibrium
welfare level will always be below the rst best for all allowed levels of k as this dead
weight loss can never be equalized by higher prots or higher tax revenue. Again,
welfare is minimized at intermediate levels of k due to the importance of ine¢ cient
trade in this area.
The results can be summarized in proposition 6:
Proposition 6 With positive trade costs, national welfare maximizing governments
cannot achieve the rst best welfare by an optimal national tax policy. Welfare as well
as prots are minimized for intermediate levels of trade costs.
2.3.2 International merger
Turning to the international merger scenario, the welfare maximization problem de-
scribed in (2.7) is solved by levying the following optimal tax rate:
tA(IM) = t
B
(IM) =  
5
23
(a  r) + 11
23
k (2.14)
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Starting with the assumption of costless trade (k = 0), the equilibrium tax rate in-
creases compared to the benchmark scenario. This can be explained by the interna-
tional ownership diversication in consequence of the international merger between rm
1 in country A and rm 3 in country B building the new entity f : this internationally
merged rm f is owned equally by both countries leading to an incentive to tax prots
accruing to foreigners.
Considering the impact of positive trade costs, national welfare maximizing govern-
ments are faced with adjusted incentives. Therefore note that the relative importance
of domestically produced products increases less with higher trade costs in the in-
ternational merger scenario than in the benchmark scenario43, which can be seen by
comparing the respective results shown in (2.6) and (2.3)44. This decreased market
share response of domestic rms to changes in trade costs implies that governments
have a lower incentive to grant subsidies to these rms for e¢ ciency reasons as soon
as trade costs rise (decreased e¢ ciency incentive for subsidies). There are even more
incentives to grant lower subsidies (or to levy higher taxes) compared to the benchmark
case if trade costs increase: an increase of k generates a competitive advantage for the
international merged rm. This is the only one that can avoid trade costs by producing
in every country and therefore ends up with a higher market share in both countries.
Recalling that the implied increase in prots of the international merged rm must be
shared equally between both countries, there is an incentive to levy higher taxes in order
to tax prots accruing to foreigners (or to shrink subsidies, respectively). Moreover,
the competitive advantage of the merged rm is a competitive disadvantage for the
other rms with respect to their willingness to export. Consequently, exports shrink
with an increase of trade costs (with respect to an exporting rm) and governments
must adjust their willingness to grant subsidies: there is a lower incentive for subsidies
in order to favor higher market shares abroad now (lower market share incentive).
All incentives taken together, the optimal tax rate or production subsidy has become
43This is reasonable as there is only one rm left in each country that has to bear trade costs such
that only this rm su¤ers from an increase of these trade costs. This implies also that the total o¤er
in each country shrinks less in the international merger than in the double duopoly scenario as soon
as trade costs rise.
44 d((xf+x2))
dk (IM) <
d((x1+x2))
dk (DD) and
d(x4)
dk (IM)
> d(x3+x4)dk (DD) holds for all allowed levels of k.
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more sensitive to changes in trade costs: higher trade costs imply a relatively higher
tax increase in the international merger scenario, dti(IM)=dk > dt
i
(DD)=dk. Proposition
7 summarizes:
Proposition 7 Optimal national tax policy reacts by a tax increase to higher trade
costs in the international merger scenario. This tax response is higher than in the pre-
merger situation due to a change of market shares of the home-producing rms and an
internationalisation of the ownership structure.
Inserting optimal tax rates (2.14) into (2.6) generates the following equilibrium
quantities as long as the equilibrium condition (2.8) as well as the condition for positive
trade are fullled45:
xf = x2 = yf = y4 =
7
23
(a  r) + 3
23
k (2.15)
x4 = y2 =
7
23
(a  r)  20
23
k
x = y =
21
23
(a  r)  14
23
k
This in turn leads to prot levels equal to
f(IM) =
2
529
(7a  7r + 3k)2 ; (2.16)
2(IM) = 4(IM) =
98
529
(a  r)2   238
529
k (a  r) + 409
529
k2 .
How are prots a¤ected by the international merger? Comparing f(IM) to 1(DD) +
3(DD) of [see eq. (2.12)], we see that the international merged rm does not benet
from their merging activity because we have f(IM) < 1(DD) + 3(DD) for all allowed
levels of k46. So rms in an oligopoly of four rms do not have an incentive for a
merger motivated exclusively by trade cost savings in this oligopolistic model with
linear demand. Therefore Salants merger paradox showing the non-attractiveness of
mergers in a standard Cournot-model47 still applies here although rms have to bear
45In the international merger scenario, trade is positive if k < 720 (a  r): Therefore the analysis is
valid for d < k < 720 (a  r):
46Recall d < k < 720 (a  r):
47See Salant et al. (1983).
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trade costs that they might overcome by an international merger. This result does not
come as a surprise because tax policy responses to merging activities are considered.
In fact, rms have to bear higher taxes if trade costs increase [recall eq. (2.14)] which
counteracts pure trade cost savings. This inuence of the response of optimal national
tax policy on prots will again be discussed in the next chapter. Nevertheless, rms
may have an incentive to pursue an international merger if this is associated with
additional savings due to synergy e¤ects. However, rms even need higher synergy
e¤ects if trade costs increase in the allowed area of k48. The reason lies again in the
positive tax policy response on trade costs and, moreover, on the fact that higher trade
costs already lead to higher prots in the original double duopoly at the minimum
considered level of k.
Non-merging rms generate higher prots after the merger for relatively low levels
of k fullling the minimum condition on k for an existing equilibrium [see condition
(2.8)]. In this area, non-merging rms simply benet from higher market concentration
as the standard Cournot model predicts. Nevertheless, if trade costs become su¢ ciently
high49, these rms su¤er from increasing taxes and competitive disadvantage due to
their disability to avoid trade costs by production in each country such that their prots
shrink.
The welfare implication of the above results can be calculated by inserting (2.15),
the resulting consumer surplus (see appendix) and (2.16) in the welfare maximizing
problem (2.7) yielding:
WA(IM) = WB(IM) =
525
1058
(a  r)2   189
529
k (a  r) + 362
529
k2 (2.17)
Again, as in the double duopoly scenario, welfare is minimized for intermediate levels of
k because there is still the highest volume of trade costs in this area (due to the trading
non-merged rms now). Moreover, even if trade costs become relatively high (but are
below their maximum value for positive trade), welfare will still be below its level in
48d
 
f(IM)   1(DD)   3(DD)

=dk = d

2
529 (7a  7r + 3k)
2   14
 
r   a+ 12k
2   k2 =dk =
865
2116 (a  r) 
8705
4232k < 0 8 k 2

d; 720 (a  r)

.
49The condition is k > 29 (a  r):
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the absence of trade costs. This can again be explained by the increased monopolistic
power of rms if markets are less integrated due to higher trade barriers. Optimal
national tax policy cannot avoid this welfare loss by implementing an appropriate tax
scheme.
The most interesting question is now if an international merger improves welfare
compared to the pre-merger situation: comparing (2.17) with (2.13) and respecting
the minimum condition on trade costs (2.8), an international merger would be welfare
increasing if trade costs fulll the following condition:
Wi(IM) > Wi(DD) if k 2

d;
2
1865
(a  r)

23
p
29 + 151

(2.18)
Now, it is the avoidance of ine¢ cient trade in the initial double duopoly setting that
renders the international merger relatively welfare increasing for this moderate level of
trade costs despite of the higher market concentration and an increased incentive for
(over)taxation. Finally, national merger control authorities would approve an interna-
tional merger proposal in this area but rms do not have any interest to pursue such
a merger without further cost savings due to synergies, for example by the implemen-
tation of a joint overhead structure.
Lets turn to the question how national regulation authorities should react if the
merging rms can indeed benet from additional cost savings consequent to the merger.
Assuming that these cost savings do not reduce variable unit production costs but some
additional xed costs, such an international merger proposal should always be approved
in this symmetric setting: cost reductions which are necessary in order to render the
international merger protable are always higher than potential welfare losses without
accounting for these additional prots50. See appendix for calculation details.
50Global welfare is analogously a¤ected as national welfare in this symmetric setting. Therefore
a supranational regulation authority would decide in line with national regulation authorities. Of
course, this would be di¤erent if both countries di¤er in their market structure.
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The nal results of this section can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 8 An international merger is not protable from the perspective of the
merging rms without further synergies. In contrast, these mergers would increase
national welfare if trade costs are moderate. If rms benet from a merger due to ad-
ditional cost savings generated by reduced xed costs, welfare maximizing governments
should always approve such a merger.
2.4 Discussion
The previous sections have shown that a trade avoiding international merger might be
in the interest of welfare maximizing regulation authorities in the presented oligopolis-
tic setting of Cournot-Competition. Nevertheless it always diminishes prots of the
involved rms in the dened area of trade costs if there are no further synergies. Be-
fore considering the impact of lower or higher trade costs, it is worth highlighting
that this result is partly driven by the tax policy response of national governments.
Therefore lets consider a situation where governments have committed themselves to
stick to the production tax rates in the benchmark scenario shown in (2.9) even if an
international merger takes place. In general, the di¤erence in prots before and after
the international merger can be stated as follows using the respective equations in the
appendix:
f   (1 + 3) =
1
400
( 14(a  r)2 + 2(a  r)(82k + 7(tA + tB)) (2.19)
 82k(tA + tB) + 568tAtB   366k2   291(t2A + t2B))
Inserting the initial equilibrium tax rate of the benchmark scenario [see eq. (2.9)], one
gets
f   (1 + 3) =  
7
128
a2 +
7
64
ar +
67
128
ak   7
128
r2   67
128
rk   495
512
k2 .
In contrast to the analysis above, there is the more intuitive result that higher
trade costs may be prot enhancing for the international merged rm that can save on
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these costs: d (f   (1 + 3)) =dk > 0: This holds if trade costs are not high enough
such that these savings would already be shrinking in total due to a decreasing trade
volume51. Moreover, it is now possible that such a merger is in the interest of the
involved rms because the joint prots would rise if k 2

14
99
(a  r); 2
5
(a  r)

52: There-
fore, it is the endogenous response of national governments adjusting their optimal tax
policies that renders these mergers unprotable53. Above all, these privately protable
mergers would imply higher welfare levels54 such that there might be an incentive that
welfare maximizing governments would prefer to credibly stick to the tax rate that was
optimal in the pre-merger situation. A relevant policy solution in the simple case of
symmetric countries would be to establish a global welfare maximizing authority that
is responsible for globally optimal tax policy. In the European context, the role of
the European Commission and European Council might be strenghtened in order to
overcome potential welfare losses due to an ine¢ ciently low international consolidation
of homogenous rms. Therefore this is one reason among many others calling for the
establishment of a high degree of tax harmonization and global welfare maximizing
subsidy schemes on the European or even higher international level.
Finally, one has to pinpoint that the presented analysis is limited with respect to
several aspects. First, as already stated, the focus is on an intermediate level of trade
costs k 2

d; 7
20
(a  r)

. If trade costs were lower, for example due to a high degree
of market liberalization, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies would not exist in the
international merger scenario as there is always one country that will try to attract
the production of the internationally mobile rm. If trade costs were instead higher,
there would be no trade between countries. This would imply a duopolistic market
structure in both countries to which both governments could intervene by choosing an
optimal subsidy to generate a rst best solution in the absence of foreign ownership.
51Precisely, k < 134495 (a  r) must be satised.
52Note that there is no minimium condition on trade costs in order to establish a Nash equilibrium
in this scenario (compare condition 2.8). This is simply because governments cannot adjust their tax
rates.
53Note that k 2

14
99 (a  r);
2
5 (a  r)

lies entirely in the analysed range of trade costs in the
international merger scenario with optimal tax adjustment in the non-cooperative tax competition
game.
54Inserting the welfare maximizing pre-merger tax rate (2.9) into the resulting welfare expression
(2.7) of the post-merger market structure, privately protable mergers are always socially desirable.
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I have assumed to have national owned rms prior to the merger in order to focus
on the role of trade costs here. Allowing for foreign ownership of national rms, as
analysed in HS (2009), would of course vary the magnitude of the incentives on tax
rates and its implication on prots and welfare. Nevertheless, the basic insights should
be left unchanged as the fundamental e¤ects are still at work. Especially, the higher
tax elasticity to changes in trade costs in the post-merger situation is still in place even
if there would be a complete ownership diversication prior to the merger either for all
rms or only for the rms involved in the merger.
Another critical assumption constitutes the one of linear demand. Nevertheless, as
long as the inverse demand is strictly monotonously decreasing with the quantity x,
the fundamental incentives for optimal national tax policy should be at work again.
Moreover, I have focused on symmetric countries. Obviously, policy conclusions could
become completely di¤erent if one considers asymmetric countries, especially from the
national perspective. For example, there would be a higher market share incentive to
subsidize domestic products for the foreign market if this market is relatively large.
Last but not least, one might think about the incentives of the non-merged rms.
As I have assumed a symmetric setting, these rms have the same incentives to pursue
a merger in the very beginning. Indeed, mergers occur often in waves such that a
simultaneous international merger between all rms could be of interest. In this case a
duopoly in each country would be created avoiding any (ine¢ cient) trade. Moreover,
these mergers would generate a complete international ownership diversication as
all rms are now owned equally by both countries. This in turn would imply that
national tax authorities have an increased incentive to tax prots accruing to foreigners.
This overtaxation might counteract the e¢ ciency gain of saved trade costs. But the
question arises under which circumstances a double merger scenario might be realistic:
essentially, all rms would have to coordinate such that they can pursue a simultaneous
merger which is clearly against any anti-trust law. Consequently it might be reasonable
to think about consecutive merging activities. This analysis is beyond the scope of this
paper, but a consecutive merger of the remaining rms should also imply a trade-o¤
between an increased incentive for governments to tax prots accruing to foreigners
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and a prot and welfare gain due to more home market production55.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper has dealt with the interaction of non cooperative tax competition policy
and cross border mergers in an oligopolistic market of a homogenous good under the
consideration of trade costs. It has been shown that trade costs play a role in the de-
termination of national welfare maximizing tax schemes. Thereby, the e¤ect depends
on the market structures under consideration. Finally, using a linear demand and sym-
metric countries, governments have always an incentive to levy higher tax rates as soon
as there are higher trade costs. We have seen that this incentive is more pronounced if
a cross border merger takes place. Considering the second instrument at the disposal
of governments, namely merger control, governments should take the possibility to ad-
just their tax schemes into account if they have to decide on an international merger
proposal in the very beginning. In the example of linear demand, we have seen that
this tax response renders any cross-border merger unprotable if rms do not benet
from further cost savings in addition to savings on trade costs. In the specic example
considered here, governments should approve any proposed cross border mergers as
the implied total cost savings are always su¢ cient to render the new market struc-
ture welfare increasing. The policy implication of this analysis is twofold: on the one
hand, governments should adjust their tax rates in order to maximize national welfare
for a new given market structure. On the other hand, market concentration by cross
border merging activities introduces an incentive for higher taxes dependant on the
level of trade costs which renders mergers unprotable although they might be socially
benecial. This is the case if there are important savings on ine¢ cient trade costs.
Therefore governments might have an incentive for international tax coordination in
order to overcome these welfare losses. They can even be better o¤ by keeping taxes
55A complete analysis of alternative merger scenarios also comprises the alternative of national
mergers. In comparison to an international merger, there would be again a trade o¤ between a lower
incentive for overtaxation in the national merger scenario and trade cost savings in the international
merger.
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or subsidies unchanged favoring cross-border merging activities56. But the best way
to overcome negative welfare e¤ects of ine¢ cient trade costs is, of course, to diminish
these trade costs as far as possible. The abolishment of any trade barriers, for example
as proposed in the Doha Development Agenda might also trigger more e¢ cient sector
specic tax and subsidy schemes.The extent to which welfare implications change if
countries are asymmetric might be up to future research.
56If countries are symmetric, maximizing global welfare would also be optimal from a national
perspective.
Part II
R&D in Europe
- an overview of
business R&D expenditure and
its implications for growth accounting -
Chapter 3
Business R&D expenditure and
capital in Europe57
3.1 Introduction
The economic literature has long recognized the importance of innovation and its or-
ganized production in the form of research and development (R&D) in fostering pro-
ductivity (Arrow 1962; Griliches 1979; Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991;
for an overview see Uppenberg 2009a). One specic feature of knowledge is that it
has public-good characteristics: non-rivalness and non-exhaustibility. This means that
knowledge, whose producers incur private costs, can spill overto other private en-
tities (Arrow 1962). In the presence of spillovers, increasing returns to scale can be
achieved in production, translating into long-run economic growth (Romer 1990).
Considering the eminent role attributed to R&D in promoting productivity growth,
a countrys total R&D expenditure is widely regarded as an informative measure of its
technological innovation capacity and, hence as one of the determinants of its long-run
growth. Moreover, there is evidence for own R&D being important for the absorption
of new knowledge produced by others (Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Gri¢ th et al. 2004).
Thus a countrys own R&D expenditure is also regarded as a measure of its ability to
57This chapter is joint work with Christian Helmers (University of Oxford) and Hubert Strauss
(EIB Luxembourg).
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benet from international knowledge spillovers.
Conceptually, R&D is an input measure of innovation and does not necessarily
reect the actual amount of innovation produced. Indeed, producing an invention and
turning it into a commercial success usually involves a considerable time lag and is
subject to uncertainty. This means that the relation between R&D expenditure and
resulting innovations let alone productivity advances is not easily identiable. The
economic literature has nevertheless extensively looked at the input side when assessing
innovation activities of countries, industries and rms because nding good empirical
measures of innovation is challenging. R&D expenditure is the most precise and best-
researched innovation input measure available so far, albeit not the most comprehensive
one58.
When rms develop new products and processes, they do not only build on knowl-
edge acquired in the current year but use a large stock of knowledge accumulated inside
and outside the rm over many years through basic research, experimental develop-
ment, prototypes, and learning from past failures. Hence, just as for tangible capital,
it is the size of the R&D capital stock rather than the last vintage of R&D expenditure
that determines output in a given year. The R&D capital stock may be interpreted as
the value of the business sectors aggregate scientic and engineering knowledge.
The principal motivation for measuring the stock of R&D capital is to assess its
widely-recognised contribution to GDP growth. Yet, knowing the R&D capital stocks
requires treating R&D expenditure as an investment in the rst place. The fundamental
shift away from treating R&D as an intermediate input for rms towards treating it as
an investment represents one of the major changes to the System of National Accounts
agreed internationally in 2008 (European Commission et al. 2009, p. 206). The move
has consequences for the estimated levels and growth rates of GDP, labour productivity
and factor income shares59.
This study gives a broad-brushed overview of R&D in Europe, the US and Japan,
58For broad estimates of intangible capital, which also include brands, novel designs, rm-specic
human capital and e¢ ciency-enhancing innovations of rmsorganisational structures, and their role
in productivity growth see van Ark et al. (2009). See also Bontempi and Mairesse (2008).
59See also chapter 4 of this work.
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thereby zooming in on the business sector and focusing more on R&D capital stocks
than on R&D expenditure. Acknowledging the conceptual and measurement problems
surrounding the construction of R&D capital stocks, we present updated and new
estimates of business R&D capital stocks for 22 countries at the industry60 level.
We uncover substantial variation in R&D capital stocks even across relatively ho-
mogenous industrialized economies. Di¤erences exceed by far those in tangible capital
and labour. There is hardly any sign of convergence in R&D capital stocks, both within
the EU and between the EU, the US and Japan (the so-called triad). Throughout the
triad, R&D capital stocks are concentrated on three broad manufacturing industries:
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals, Transport equipment, and ICT and other equipment.
Furthermore, we examine to what extent di¤erences in estimated R&D capital stocks
help understand diverging productivity dynamics across countries and industries. Fi-
nally, we illustrate how countries and industries di¤er with respect to how they blend
R&D capital and tangible capital in producing output.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of trends
and broad patterns of R&D expenditure in Europe. Section 3.3 presents estimates of
R&D capital stocks and discusses their evolution over time as well as industry patterns.
Section 3.4 illustrates factor input ratios by relating R&D capital stocks to the stocks
of total tangible capital and of specic types of tangible assets. Section 3.5 summarises
the main ndings and discusses some policy implications. Since the concepts presented
in this article are quite technical, readers nd a glossary of technical terms in appendix
3.1.
60In this paper, industry refers to the branches of the International Standard Industrial Clas-
sication (ISIC) or regional variants thereof (e.g. the NACE for Europe) and, hence, may refer to
services as well as to manufacturing. By contrast, sector relates to institutional sectors of the
national accounts such as households, non-nancial corporations and the government.
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3.2 Business R&D expenditure in Europe: Trends
and patterns
3.2.1 Total and business R&D: Stable over time and below
target
At the summit in Lisbon in 2000, EU heads of state launched an ambitious strategy
for growth and jobs, which has since been known as the Lisbon strategy. The main
objective is to close Europes gap in productivity growth vis-à-vis the US and to make
the EU economy the most productive and competitive economy in the world. To help
governments reach this overarching goal, the strategy sets a number of quantiable
objectives in a wide range of policy elds relevant for GDP growth such as labour
markets, product market competition, entrepreneurship, higher education, and research
and innovation.
Figure 3.1: R&D expenditure by sector (percent of GDP), 2000-2007
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One of the most visible Lisbon targets is that of increasing total R&D expenditure
to 3 percent of GDP, with 2 percent of GDP coming from the business sector. It
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is also one of the targets that have been missed most markedly. Economy-wide, the
EU has spent, on average, only 1.8 percent of GDP on R&D this decade, compared
with 2.7 percent for the US and 3.2 percent for Japan (Figure 3.1). The breakdown
of these gures by institutional sector indicates that the gap is in the business sector
whereas R&D by governments and higher-education institutions is on par with the
US and Japan. In 2007, Business expenditure on R&D (BERD) represented close to
1.2 percent of GDP. An increase by 70 percent would be required to meet the Lisbon
objective of 2 percent of GDP. This is why the remainder of this article focuses on
business R&D from subsection 3.2.2 onwards.
Figure 3.2: Business R&D expenditure (percent of GDP), 1995-2007
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Not only was the EU missing the 3-percent target in the late 2000s but there is no
sign that the Union has started moving towards the target over time. BERD in the EU
has been stuck at about 1.2 percent of GDP for more than a decade and there is no
catching up with the US and Japan (Figure 3.2). On the contrary, Japan is speeding
ahead.
Among the EU member states, only Finland and Sweden have total R&D expendi-
ture above 3 percent of GDP, followed by Austria, Denmark and Germany at around
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percent (appendix 3.3). The apparent stagnation of R&D expenditure in the EU
masks remarkable increases in some countries. For example, BERD has sharply in-
creased in Austria and Denmark. Starting from a much lower level, Spain, Portugal
and the Baltic countries have also recorded signicant growth in BERD even though
their total R&D expenditure is still at or below 1 percent of GDP.
3.2.2 The EU is less R&D intensive than the US and Japan
also at the industry level
A natural question to ask in further diagnosing Europes comparatively low BERD is
whether it persists at the level of individual industries. Indeed, Europes low overall
BERD could reect (i) low R&D intensity dened as BERD relative to value added
in most or all industries (R&D intensity e¤ect), (ii) an industry composition e¤ect
whereby Europe might be specialised on industries relying less on formalized R&D, or
(iii) a combination of (i) and (ii)61.
In answering this question, it is useful to start by showing which industries spend
most on R&D. Figure 3.3 gives this information for the three economic zones of the
triad. Three main insights emerge. First, three broad manufacturing-industry groups
account for the brunt of R&D: Chemicals and pharmaceuticals (ISIC 24), Transport
equipment (ISIC 34 and 35) and ICT and other non-transport equipment (ISIC 29
to 33). These industries make up three quarters of aggregate BERD in the EU and
even 80 percent in Japan although they produce less than one-tenth of GDP62. Second,
within these three leading industry groups, Japans R&D is more concentrated on
ICT equipment than R&D in the EU and the US while Europe has a stronger focus on
Transport equipment. Third, outside the three leading manufacturing industry groups,
the US records a signicant share of BERD almost one third in services whereas
Japan spends a lot on other manufacturing.
61This subsection draws on and updates Uppenberg (2009b).
62Because of their high R&D intensity, the individual industries in the three broad groups are all
labelled as either high-technology or medium-to-high-technology in the OECDs classication of tech-
nology intensities in manufacturing while the remaining manufacturing industries are low-technology
or medium-to-low technology. See Table A1 of Danguy et al. (2009) for an overview of all individual
manufacturing industries.
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Figure 3.3: BERD by industry groups, EU, 2005
However, a strong caveat must be put on international comparisons of BERD at the
industry level. According to international conventions, R&D statistics should allocate
each R&D activity to the targeted product eld (e.g. a new computer) rather than
the main activity (measured by turnover) of the R&D-performing company. Moreover,
R&D activities by specialised R&D service rms (ISIC 73) should be allocated to the
industries purchasing these services. Countries di¤er as to whether they follow these
conventions. This matters for the reported industry breakdown of BERD (see also
appendix 3.2).
We therefore distinguish between three groups of countries by decreasing degree of
comparability when comparing individual EU countries and their industry-level R&D
data. Country group 1 comprises countries that follow the product eld approach in
collecting R&D data. These are Belgium, Finland, France, Sweden and the UK. We
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also include Germany and the Netherlands which, albeit following the main-activity
approach, break down the R&D expenditure of their biggest R&D-performing compa-
nies by product eld. The other countries collect BERD by companiesmain activity.
Country group 2 comprises countries that reallocate part or all of the BERD by R&D
service rms to the consuming industries, most often located in manufacturing. All
other countries are in country group 3. The bulk of BERD in the EU is done in group-1
countries whereas the US and Japan fall into group 3.
With that caveat in mind, we now look at industry-level R&D intensities and in-
dustry composition in order to understand what accounts for Europes gap in overall
BERD. In doing so, we focus on the three most R&D-intensive manufacturing industry
groups that account for some three quarters of total BERD. Figure 3.4 shows that the
lower overall R&D intensity in the EU compared with the US and Japan applies to all
three industry groups. The chemical and pharmaceutical industry of Japan spent 23
percent of its value added on R&D in 2005, compared with 18 percent and 13 percent
for their US and EU counterparts, respectively. Europes gap is even larger in ICT and
other non-transport equipment industries. By contrast, it is small in Transport equip-
ment where R&D intensities are broadly the same throughout the triad at between
15 and 18 percent. The rst conclusion therefore is that the R&D intensity e¤ect is
at work in key industries. Arguably, this accounts for a good part of Europes gap in
overall R&D expenditure vis-à-vis the US and Japan.
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that lower R&D intensity accounts for
all of the gap because di¤erences in specialization might matter, too. This would be
the case if the output of technology-intensive manufacturing industries were smaller in
the EU compared with the US and Japan. Figure 3.5 shows the share of each industry
groups value added in aggregate value added for the EU, the US and Japan. When
measured at current prices  as is done in the left half of gure 3.5  technology-
intensive manufacturing contributed 8 percent to aggregate value added in the EU,
more than in the US (6 percent) but less than in Japan (10 percent). Thus, it seems
that the EU is more specialized in technology-intensive manufacturing production than
the US and, hence, that the gap vis-à-vis the US is entirely due to lower industry R&D
intensities.
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Figure 3.4: R&D intensity in technology-intensive industries in the triad (percent of
industry real value added), 2005
However, things look di¤erent when basing the analysis on real value added. The
right half of gure 3.5 depicts each industrys contribution to real value added, i.e. value
added in prices of 1995. From this perspective, the EU is less specialized than the US
on technology-intensive manufacturing (share of 9 percent compared with 121
2
percent)
while Japan continues to be most specialized (16 percent). The di¤erence between
real and nominal shares stems from ICT and other non-transport industries and is
particularly pronounced in the US and Japan but small for the EU. This is because
within this broad industry group, the US, and even more so Japan, are specialized on
ICT-equipment production where prices decline much faster than in other industries
such as machine-tools and optical instruments. Since these price declines are themselves
to a large extent technology-driven and, hence, dependent on R&D, it makes sense to
assess the industrys contribution to the level of GDP on real value added63. Closer
inspection of the right half of gure 3.5 suggests that the share in real value added
of ICT and other non-transport equipment is signicantly smaller in the EU than in
the US and in Japan, pointing to an industry composition e¤ect alongside the R&D
63By contrast, nominal value added is more appropriate to assess the resource cost of R&D as
compared to other inputs.
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intensity e¤ect mentioned above.
Figure 3.5: Industry composition of value added in the triad, 2005
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Source: Eurostat, own calculations
Notes: In the right half of the figure, the share of each industry is defined as the ratio of the industry's real value added to
total-economy real value added. The share of "All other industries" equals the difference between 100 percent and the
sum of the five industry groups shown.
All in all, this section has shown that R&D expenditure in the EU lags behind
that in the US and Japan, which is attributable to the business sector rather than
the government sector. There has been no sign of the EU catching-up with the other
areas of the triad over the past 15 years. BERD is heavily concentrated on three
technology-intensive manufacturing industry groups: Transport equipment, ICT and
other equipment, and Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals. The lower R&D intensities in
the latter two and the modest size of Europes ICT-producing industries account for
most of the shortfall in overall BERD.
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3.3 Business R&D capital stocks: New evidence at
the country and industry levels
As stated in the introduction, deriving R&D capital stocks from annual investment
ows allows to approximate a countrys or an industrys scientic and engineering
knowledge with a single number. It is a necessary step in using R&D in the analysis
of economic growth64. This section rst presents estimates of R&D capital stocks for
the business sectors of 22 countries and illustrates how they have evolved over time.
It then discusses how the stocks are distributed across industries and to what extent
productivity is associated with R&D capital.
3.3.1 Estimates of aggregate business R&D capital stocks
In general terms, the capital stock K is a function of all past and current investment I
and of depreciation. Specically, the capital stock today equals the part of last years
capital stock that survives that is, the part that has not depreciated plus current
investment here the R&D expenditure of the current year. This is the intuition of
the perpetual-inventory method, which can be written as:
Kt = Kt 1(1  d) + It (3.1)
where d denotes the depreciation rate and subscripts t and (t-1) stand for the cur-
rent and previous year, respectively. The computation of R&D stocks is conceptually
straightforward but it is fraught with practical challenges, notably with respect to the
depreciation rate, the initial capital stock and the deator. An overview of these issues
and how they are addressed in this study is given in appendix 3.4.
64Ideally, the analysis should go one step further. As with capital services (OECD 2009a), the
ideal input indicator for GDP accounting is R&D capital services. The use is complicated by varying
estimates of returns to R&D. In using R&D capital stocks, we assume that they are proportional
to R&D capital services, thereby abstracting from cyclical uctuations and assuming a geometric
depreciation pattern. See also gure A.4.1 (of the appendix to chapter 4) for an illustration of the
di¤erences between capital stocks and capital services.
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This study covers all OECD countries with available data. In terms of cross-country
comparability, the best data source for R&D expenditure at the industry level is the
OECDs Analytical database on Business expenditure on R&D (ANBERD). This data
source has also been used by the EUKLEMS project in the computation of R&D capital
stocks up to 2003 (EU KLEMS 2008b). We use these R&D capital stocks and extend
them to 2005 for some countries and to 2006 for others, thereby taking advantage of the
most recent release of ANBERD (OECD 2009b). Moreover, we estimate R&D capital
stocks for seven more countries: Austria, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Turkey. In total, we get estimates for 22 countries: the US, Japan, Turkey as well
as 19 EU countries. The latter cover about 95 percent of EU GDP and an even higher
share of EU BERD, allowing for the calculation of EU aggregates. Further details
about the data sources are given in appendix 3.5.
Figure 3.6: Business R&D capital stock estimates (percent of real value added), 2005
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Figure 3.6 illustrates the results in their most aggregate way. The business R&D
capital stock in the EU was equal to 9 percent of total real value added65 in 2005
65In relating aggregate business R&D capital stocks to the size of the economy (i.e. output), we
use aggregate real value added rather than real GDP in order to be consistent with the industry detail
presented in gure 3.4 and in subsections 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5 and 3.4.2. The two concepts are slightly
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2
percent in the US and 16 percent in Japan. Put di¤erently, production is
more R&D capital intensive in the US than in the EU and is even more R&D capital
intensive in Japan. Akin to R&D intensity in section 3.2, we refer to R&D capital
intensity when expressing the R&D capital stock as a ratio of the size of the economy,
notably of value added (also see appendix 3.1).
Figure 3.7: R&D capital stocks across countries (percent of real value added), 2005
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Europes low R&D capital intensity masks dramatic cross-country di¤erences, which
are shown in gure 3.7. Overall, R&D capital is thinly spread throughout the southern
and eastern parts of the EU. In 2005, the business R&D (BERD) capital stock repre-
sented 20 percent of value added in Sweden, around 15 percent in Finland and Austria
but only 1 to 2 percent in Poland and Greece. A range from 1 to 20 is clearly in excess
of the range of international di¤erences in the use of other factors of production such
as tangible capital and labour. As to the countries for which we present rst estimates
ever, business R&D capital stocks in 2005 were below the EU average in all of them ex-
di¤erent and, hence, the numbers of aggregate value added and GDP are not the same. For one thing,
value added is evaluated at basic prices, GDP at market prices. What is more, the deators used to
obtain real measures are not the same for value added and GDP. As capital stocks are a real concept,
we always divide them by real value added when discussing R&D capital intensities.
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cept in Austria: 5.9 percent in Slovenia, 5.1 percent in the Czech Republic, 3.2 percent
in Slovakia, 2.5 percent in Hungary, 1.8 percent in Portugal and 1 percent in Turkey.
Another nding of our analysis is that more than 90 percent of the EU R&D capital
stock is located in the western and northern EU countries.
3.3.2 Convergence and divergence of R&D capital stocks in
the EU
Figure 3.8: R&D capital stocks of EU countries, 1995-2006
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Notes: For each country, the R&D capital stock in 1995 is set equal to 100.
Evolutions in France and Germany have been very similar, making it difficult to distinguish the two lines.
To illustrate how rapidly persistent di¤erences in the level of R&D expenditure
translate into diverging R&D capital stocks, gure 3.8 sets each countrys BERD capital
stock equal to 100 in 1995, thus abstracting from its size relative to the economy or
to other countriesstocks. For selected EU countries, the gure shows how the index
evolves over time compared to each countrys own starting position. Countries that
swiftly increased their R&D expenditure saw their R&D capital stocks expand over
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the past decade, sometimes by 100 percent or more (Finland, Denmark, Spain and
Sweden). However, R&D capital stocks have expanded only by 20 to 30 percent in
the EUs largest economies, with the pace of expansion falling slightly short of the EU
average in France and Germany and staying more signicantly behind in Italy and the
UK.
It takes a combination of the two views presented above  the size of the R&D
capital stock relative to the economy and the evolution of R&D capital stocks over
time to make statements about whether EU countries tend to converge or diverge
in terms of R&D capital intensity. This is done in gure 3.9, which depicts the R&D
capital stock as a share of value added in 1995 on the horizontal axis and the change in
that ratio during the subsequent decade on the vertical axis. The cross-lines represent
the EU average for each dimension. They cut the gure into four areas. Countries in the
upper-left area (e.g. Belgium) are catching up. they had below-average R&D capital
stocks in 1995 but stocks have since grown faster than the EU average. Countries in
the upper-right area are speeding ahead. A drastic example is Sweden. Already in
1995, it had Europes largest R&D capital stock. Nevertheless, it recorded one of the
strongest increases in that stock during the following decade. Below the horizontal line
are countries with R&D capital stocks expanding more slowly than the EU average in
the past decade, either because they are losing steam from a strong position (lower-
right area) or because they are falling further behind the EU average (lower-left area).
If all dots were aligned on a downward sloping line or at least situated in the upper-left
and lower-right areas of the gure, all countries would be converging. Conversely, all
dots being aligned on an upward-sloping line would signal divergence.
There has been hardly any convergence in R&D capital stocks between EU countries
since 1995. True, six out of 13 EU countries are in the catching-uparea while four
are in the divergence zone with two speeding ahead (Germany and Sweden) and two
falling behind (Italy and the UK). France, Greece and the Netherlands expanded their
R&D capital stocks in line with the EU average and, hence, were neither converging
nor diverging. Yet, a closer look at the countries in the catching-uparea calls for
a distinction between countries close to the average and those far behind. The close
followers (Belgium, Denmark and Finland) overtook the EU average during 1995-2005
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Figure 3.9: Convergence and divergence of R&D capital stocks at the country level
Source: EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Notes: The vertical line represents the R&D capital stock of the EU in 1995 (13 countries with available data) and
the horizontal line the cumulative change of this stock. The intersection of the lines represents the data
point for the EU.
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and are now actually speeding ahead. In contrast, the true laggardsprogress has been
so slow that at the current pace it will take decades before they reach the EU average.
Besides, the new EU member states are not shown in this picture due to missing data
for 1995 but they further increase the number of countries far behind the EU average,
for which convergence to the EUs average R&D capital intensity cannot be taken for
granted and would, in any case, be a matter of decades, not years. Finally, the gure
shows that the EU as a whole has fallen behind compared to Japan but has marginally
caught up with the US.
As R&D capital is deemed to be an important (albeit so far unreported) factor
of production in advanced economies, one would expect marked cross-country di¤er-
ences in the size of R&D capital stocks to shape countriescomparative advantage in
technology-intensive manufacturing. This should especially be the case if higher R&D
intensity of a given industry in one country is conducive to higher productivity of the
industry compared with its counterpart in other countries. The connection between
R&D capital and productivity will be shown in subsection 3.3.4 below.
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A comprehensive policy discussion on whether it is feasible and economically sen-
sible to design policies that speed up convergence in national R&D capital stocks and
whether governments in lagging EU countries are doing enough to that end is beyond
the scope of this chapter. It su¢ ces here to note that full convergence is unlikely to
happen by itself because of the spillovers implied by knowledge-intensive activities and
the resulting tendency for these activities to cluster in space. As a consequence, aim-
ing at full convergence by all means would be very costly. Nevertheless, the economic
literature on R&D stresses that R&D capital is not only needed in the most advanced
economies to push the technology frontier further out. It is also required for lagging
countries to catch up with the frontier since understanding and imitating new tech-
nological developments requires at least some domestic R&D activity (Griliches and
Lichtenberg 1984; Gri¢ th et al. 2003 and 2004; Cameron et al. 2005; Acemoglu et
al. 2006). In line with these considerations, recent policy simulations nd that coun-
tries with low R&D capital intensity would benet the most from R&D promoting and
skill-upgrading policies (DAuria et al. 2009).
3.3.3 The distribution of R&D capital stocks across industries
This section has so far taken a birds eye view on the R&D capital stocks. We now
ask where in the economy the R&D capital stock is actually located, as it was done for
R&D expenditure in subsection 3.2.2 above. We answer the question for the EU as a
whole rst before considering intra-EU di¤erences.
Figure 3.10 depicts the estimated R&D capital stocks for the three zones of the
triad and breaks the total down by large industry groups. There are two main insights,
both broadly in line with gure 3.3 above. First, about three quarters of the total
R&D capital stock are located in three industries: Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals,
Transport equipment and ICT- and other equipment. Second, the comparison between
the EU and each of Japan and the US suggests that only one industry group accounts for
the di¤erences in economy-wide R&D capital intensities. In particular, the di¤erence
between the EU and Japan is mainly due to Japans high stock of R&D capital in
ICT-producing industries. In turn, the di¤erence between the EU and the US seems
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Figure 3.10: R&D capital stocks by industry in the triad (percent of total real value
added), 2005
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to be due to higher R&D capital stocks in the US services industries. This latter
result, however, should be taken with a pinch of salt due to the comparability issues
of industry-level R&D data discussed in subsection 3.2.2 above. Redistributing some
of the US R&D capital stock from services to manufacturing would bring the industry
breakdown in line with that in the EU. This suggests that the EU-US gap results from
higher R&D capital intensity throughout the US economy.
Turning to intra-EU di¤erences, countries di¤er not only with respect to the overall
size of their R&D capital stocks but also with respect to the industry structure of these
stocks. gure 3.11 depicts the ratio of the total R&D capital stock to real value added
(height of the bars) like gure 3.7 above. In addition, it shows how much each industry
group contributes to that ratio (height of the individual colour segments). Countries
are sorted into two groups whereby data comparability is highest in country group 1 and
lower in country group 2, as described in subsection 3.2.2 above. The other countries
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Figure 3.11: R&D capital stocks by industry within the EU (percent of total real value
added), 2005
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Notes:
- Country group 1 contains countries w ith high degree of international comparability of industry-level R&D data.
- Countries in country group 2 are less comparable but comparability is higher than for Group-3 countries, w hich are not show n.
- See subsection 3.2.2 and appendix 3.2 for details.
(group 3) are not shown since industry-level R&D data are hardly comparable with
those of countries in groups 1 and 2.
The seven countries in country group 1 cover the lions share of the R&D capital
stock in the EU and are therefore fairly representative for the EU total in terms of in-
dustry structure. The frontrunners Sweden and Finland have huge R&D capital stocks
in industries producing ICT and other non-transport equipment, both compared with
R&D capital stocks in other industries and with the size of the overall economy. They
also display larger R&D capital stocks in services. While R&D in Finland is concen-
trated on ICT equipment, Sweden has a more balanced industry composition of R&D
capital. Sizeable R&D capital stocks in ICT-equipment industries are observed for
France and Germany, too, but they are matched by R&D capital stocks in Transport
equipment. In Belgium and the Netherlands, in turn, the chemical and pharmaceuti-
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cal industry is the most important and second-most important host of R&D capital,
respectively, alongside ICT and other non-transport equipment.
Denmark is the only R&D-capital-intensive EU country in group 2. Chemicals
and Pharmaceuticals is the largest contributor in manufacturing. Services seem to be
important, too, even though part of this might just be due to the main activity approach
in R&D data collection. Finally, we nd that the broad industry structure of R&D
capital in Hungary resembles that of Belgium, with Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals
being the main and ICT and other non-transport equipment the second contributor.
One should bear in mind that the industry contributions to aggregate R&D capital
stocks shown in gures 3.10 and 3.11 might be a¤ected by industry-composition e¤ects:
if a given industry is equally R&D capital intensive in two countries but is larger
(relative to GDP) in country A than in country B, the industry contributes more to
the total R&D capital stock in country A than its counterpart in country B.
3.3.4 R&D capital stocks and productivity
As R&D capital is arguably an important factor of production in advanced economies,
the marked cross-country di¤erences both in the size and the industry composition
of R&D capital stocks could shape countries comparative advantage in technology-
intensive manufacturing. We now look at the association between productivity and
R&D capital stocks to see whether the latter could be a source of dynamic comparative
advantage.
Accounting for labour and tangible capital alone leaves a signicant part of GDP
growth unexplained (Solow 1956). The growth-accounting literature documents that
the contribution to labour productivity growth of total factor productivity (TFP) is
indeed large (see Uppenberg 2009a). TFP is a summary index of the overall e¢ ciency
with which capital and labour are combined in producing output and, hence TFP
growth measures the gains in this e¢ ciency. When TFP is estimated in a conventional
growth-accounting framework featuring only labour and tangible capital, the resulting
TFP levels are likely to be correlated with factors omitted from the accounting. R&D
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capital stocks are one of these factors. For example, rms that obtain an innovative
production process from investment in R&D enhance their productivity without a need
to increase labour or tangible capital66.
Figure 3.12 illustrates that there is indeed a positive link between R&D capital
and conventional TFP at the industry level. It plots average annual TFP growth over
the 15-year period 1991-2005 (vertical axis) against R&D capital intensity (horizontal
axis) at the beginning of that period for 13 manufacturing industries and nine coun-
tries for which TFP data are available: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and the US. The scatter plot suggests a pos-
itive association between initial R&D capital intensity and subsequent TFP growth
at the industry-level across countries67. But the graph also suggests considerable het-
erogeneity across countries and industries, both in terms of TFP growth and initial
R&D capital intensity. A number of industries achieve rapid TFP growth while some
others are characterised by a decline in TFP over the sample period68. R&D capital
intensities are also strongly dispersed, with R&D capital stocks ranging from near zero
to the equivalent of two yearsvalue added69. Overall, TFP growth tends to be higher
in more R&D capital intensive industries.
The positive correlation between R&D capital intensity and TFP growth comes as
no surprise in light of a large body of theoretical endogenous-growth models attributing
knowledge a key role in generating long-run growth. It has also been conrmed in the
empirical literature assessing the link between R&D and TFP growth at the industry
level. A classic reference is the study for the US by Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984)
that examines the relation between privately funded R&D capital intensity and TFP
for the manufacturing industry in the 1960s and 1970s. Notably, they nd average
66The inclusion of R&D as additional production factor to capital and labour is treated in chapter
4 of this dissertation.
67The correlation coe¢ cient is signicant and amounts to 0.34, based on a country-industry sample
cleaned for a few extreme outliers, i.e. country-industry pairs with average annual TFP growth rates
larger than 20 percent or less than -5 percent.
68The industry with the sharpest drop in TFP Coke, rened petroleum and nuclear fuelin Japan
and the US. The fastest growing industries in the sample are ICT and other non-transport equipment
in Japan, Wood and products of wood and cork in Finland and Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals in
Germany.
69The lowest R&D capital intensities are in Wood and products of wood and cork and in Textiles
and leather products in Italy. The highest R&D intensities are in Transport equipment, ICT and
other equipment, in the Netherlands, the US, France, and the UK.
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Figure 3.12: The connection between R&D capital stocks and productivity
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Notes:    Each dot represents a country-industry pair from a sample of 13 manufacturing industries in nine countries
                with available data from 1991 to 2005. TFP data are taken from EUKLEMS' growth accounting results
                based on double-deflated value added and accounting for hours worked, labour quality and various types
                of tangible capital.  R&D-capital intensity are industry-specific ratios of R&D capital stock (our estimates)
                to real value added (from EUKLEMS).
TFP growth to be higher in relatively more R&D-intensive industries70.
3.3.5 Summing up
This section has presented new and updated estimates of business R&D capital stocks
for 22 countries. The EU business R&D capital stock at 9 percent of GDP falls short
of its US and Japanese counterparts, mostly due to much lower R&D capital intensity
in industries producing ICT and other non-transport equipment. What is more, the
R&D capital stock is geographically concentrated in the western and northern EU
70Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2004) compute industry capital stocks di¤erentiated by sources
of their funding (private domestic, public and foreign) and compare their impacts on TFP. For a
derivation of TFP measures in a growth regressions framework accounting also for R&D, see Eberhardt
et al. (2010).
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countries but scarce in southern EU countries and in the new member states. While
all countries with above-average overall R&D capital stocks have substantial R&D
capital in ICT and other non-transport equipment, some of them are R&D-intensive
in Transport equipment or in Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, too. These marked
cross-country di¤erences are expected to shape countries comparative advantage in
technology-intensive manufacturing.
This section has discussed R&D capital intensities, that is, the ratio of R&D capital
to output in an industry or in the economy at large. Further insights are gained by
relating R&D capital stocks to the stocks of tangible capital, i.e. to other inputs. This
is done next.
3.4 R&D capital and tangible capital
We now change the perspective and analyze the R&D capital ratio, which we dene as
the ratio of the R&D capital stock to the stock of tangible capital. By tangible capital,
we refer to all asset types for which gross xed capital formation is reported in the
national accounts. It includes transport vehicles, ICT equipment, other machinery and
equipment, residential constructions and non-residential structures, and some assets
that are, strictly speaking, intangible such as software and expenditure on mineral
exploration. R&D capital ratios are presented both for total tangible capital and for
selected asset types. Again, we rst look at countries as a whole and then take an
industry perspective.
3.4.1 Economy-wide R&D capital ratios
Figure 3.13 shows that the EU business R&D capital stock is equal to 3 percent of
its total stock of tangible capital. The EU has the lowest R&D capital ratio within
the triad. This is as expected given the gap in R&D capital discussed above. More
surprisingly, however, the US R&D capital ratio is virtually at par with Japans 41
2
percent. This is because Japans considerably higher R&D capital stock (relative to
value added) is matched by a higher stock of tangible capital. Indeed, in 2005, Japans
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aggregate output was produced with a tangible capital stock roughly 31
2
times the size
of GDP, compared with 21
2
times GDP in the US.
Figure 3.13: R&D capital ratios (percent of total tangible capital), 2005
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Source:     EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Notes:      Total tangible capital refers to all asset types for which gross fixed capital information is
                  reported in the national accounts.
Again, there are considerable cross-country di¤erences within the EU, too. The
range of R&D capital ratios spans from 0.5 percent in Portugal to 8.2 percent in Sweden
and, hence, broadly matches that of R&D capital intensities. Nevertheless, there are
notable di¤erences in the ranking of countries from the one shown in gure 3.7 above.
For instance, the UK is now a close neighbour to Germany, which spends considerably
more on R&D but also on tangible capital. In addition to the ranking, some of the
cross-country di¤erences in the size of the R&D capital ratios are surprisingly large,
others surprisingly small. Take the two European R&D frontrunners, Sweden and
Finland, for example. Sweden has almost twice the R&D capital ratio of Finland
because it uses less tangible capital in production. All in all, the connection between
total business R&D capital stocks and total tangible capital appears to be rather loose.
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Breaking down total tangible capital into several asset classes and looking at specic
R&D capital ratios (i.e. R&D capital ratios with respect to each asset class) delivers
further evidence that a given stock of R&D capital might be associated with any stock
of tangible assets. To see this, we divide the R&D capital stock by the aggregate stocks
of certain types of tangible assets. We consider the following three asset types71: ICT
and software, other machinery and equipment and non-residential structures72. It is
important to note the change in perspective. This is not about R&D in the industries
producing certain capital goods (as in Section 3.3) but about the economy-wide stock
of a certain type of tangible asset such as ICT and software.
Figure 3.14 depicts the R&D capital ratio with respect to these three asset types.
The following insights emerge. First, the EU business R&D capital stock is equal to
40 percent of its aggregate stock of ICT and software, about one quarter of its stock
of other machinery and equipment and some 8 percent of its stock of non-residential
structures. Second, there are deviations from the familiar R&D ranking Japan rst,
US second and Europe third. On the one hand, the US economy uses ICT so inten-
sively that the US R&D capital ratio with respect to ICT and software is less than half
that of Japan and even lower than that of the EU. On the other hand, the US stocks of
other machinery and equipment and of non-residential structures are so small relative
to the US economy that the US R&D capital ratios with respect to each of these two
asset types are higher than their counterparts in Japan despite Japans considerably
higher R&D capital intensity.
Third, also within the EU, the pattern of specic R&D capital ratios di¤ers from
what is expected given the distribution of R&D capital stocks alone. As far as the
R&D capital ratio with respect to ICT and software is concerned, Germany is at par
with the more R&D-capital-intensive countries Finland and Austria, suggesting that
production in Germany is less ICT-intensive. Moreover, we nd an unlikely similarity
71EU KLEMS distinguishes the following asset types: information technology, communication tech-
nology, software, transport vehicles, other machinery and equipment, residential constructions and
non-residential structures. We lump the rst three into one block, ICT and software. We exclude
residential constructions, which are not part of the productive capital stock. We also omit the stock
of transport vehicles.
72Non-residential structures include buildings (e.g. warehouses, industrial and commercial build-
ings, hotels, restaurants, educational and health buildings) and other structures (e.g. highways and
roads, railways, aireld runways, tunnels, waterways, harbours, long-distance pipelines and cables).
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Figure 3.14: R&D capital ratios with respect to specic types of tangible capital (per-
cent), 2005
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Source: EUKLEMS, OECD ANBERD, own calculations
Notes: The bars represent the ratio of the R&D capital stock to the stock of each type of tangible assets at the
country level.
in R&D capital ratios between the UK on the one hand and Denmark and Italy on the
other, which in comparison to the UK points to higher ICT intensity in Denmark but
lower ICT intensity in Italy.
Turning to the R&D capital ratio with respect to other machinery and equipment,
the rst interesting comparison is once more between Sweden and Finland. The ratio is
lower in Sweden, suggesting that Swedens higher R&D capital intensity is more than
reversed by its much larger stock of other machinery and equipment: the latter was
equal to half of total value added in 2005, compared with one quarter in Finland. As a
consequence, it is Swedens comparatively low stocks of non-residential structures and
ICT and Software that account for its higher overall R&D capital ratio shown above
in gure 3.13. A second comparison is among countries with lower R&D capital ratios.
The ratios are equal for Denmark and the Netherlands as Denmarks larger R&D capital
stock is matched by a larger stock of machinery and equipment. By contrast, Slovenias
ratio of 11 percent is half that of the UK reecting Slovenias strong manufacturing
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base and its correspondingly larger stock of machinery.
Finally, there are marked cross-country di¤erences in the R&D capital ratio with
respect to non-residential structures, for example between Sweden on the one hand
and Finland, Austria and Germany on the other. Swedens relatively lower stock of
non-residential structures results in a higher bar in gure 3.14. In a similar vein, the
stock of non-residential structures relative to the economy is also lower in the UK than
in both the Netherlands and Slovenia. All in all, the discussion of economy-wide R&D
capital ratios suggests that the cross-country di¤erences with respect to the stocks
of various types of tangible assets are not systematically aligned with those in R&D
capital stocks.
3.4.2 Industry-specic R&D capital ratios
We conclude this section by illustrating R&D capital ratios with respect to total tan-
gible capital73 in the EU for selected groups of industries. In addition, we show how
these ratios compare with the pattern of R&D capital intensities. This is done in gures
3.15 and 3.16. gure 3.15 presents the results for technology-intensive manufacturing
industries and gure 3.16 those for other industry groups. Figure 3.16 also recaps Eu-
ropes economy-wide R&D capital intensity and R&D capital ratio, illustrating that
the latter is equal to about one third of the former at the aggregate level.
The following facts are worth noting from gures 3.15 and 3.16. First, technology-
intensive manufacturing is characterized by higher R&D intensity (by a multiple of
about 10) and higher R&D capital ratios (multiple of about 30) than the economy as a
whole. Among the three industry groups, Transport equipment is the most R&D capital
intensive with an R&D capital stock of 110 percent of value added in 2005, followed by
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals (80 percent) and ICT and other equipment (close to 60
percent). By contrast, the R&D capital ratios are about the same in all three industry
groups. This means that the same hierarchy applies for R&D capital intensities as
73The even ner analysis of industry-specic R&D capital ratios with respect to specic assets
is not presented in this chapter. We nd that across countries and industries, R&D capital stocks
are slightly correlated with the stocks of ICT and software but only in the sub-sample of high-tech
manufacturing industries. No such correlation is found between R&D capital and tangible capital
other than ICT. Results are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 3.15: R&D capital intensities and R&D capital ratios: Technology-intensive
manufacturing industries, EU, 2005
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Notes: The left bar represents the ratio of the R&D capital stock to the total stock of tangible capital in each
industry. The right bar represents the ratio of the R&D capital stock to real value added in each industry.
Figure 3.16: R&D capital intensities and R&D capital ratios: Other industries, EU,
2005
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for tangible-capital intensities, with Transport equipment having the largest tangible
capital stock relative to value added, Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals the second-largest
etc.
Second, other manufacturing is still considerably more R&D intensive than other
parts of the economy such as services. A nal albeit indirect insight from the shown
gures is that the tangible capital stock in all manufacturing industry groups by and
large corresponds to about one year of value added whereas it is three years of value
added in services.
All in all, the comparison of R&D capital ratios in this section has highlighted
marked di¤erences across countries and industries in how R&D capital and (specic
types of) tangible capital are blended together in producing goods and services in
the economy. As a consequence, the ranking of countries in terms of R&D capital
ratios di¤ers from that in terms of R&D capital intensities. For the R&D capital ratio
with respect to particular asset types, we discover notable deviations from the familiar
pattern "Japan rst, US second, EU last".
3.5 Conclusions
R&D capital stocks are an important economic variable. Since it is the R&D capital
stock rather than annual investment ows that matters for growth, this article has set
out to compute R&D capital stocks for all industrialized countries with available data
and has discussed how these stocks are linked to the ows that contribute to them.
Section 3.2 has shown that R&D expenditure in the EU lags behind that in the
US and Japan, which is attributable to the business sector rather than the government
sector. EU business R&D expenditure did not start increasing to get closer to that
in the other countries of the triad over the past 15 years. Business R&D is heavily
concentrated on three technology-intensive manufacturing industry groups: Chemicals
and Pharmaceuticals, Transport equipment and ICT and other equipment. It is lower
R&D intensity in the latter two as well as the small size of Europes ICT producing
industries that account for most of the shortfall in overall business R&D expenditure.
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New estimates of business R&D capital stocks for 22 countries have been presented
in Section 3.3. They show that the EU business R&D capital stock at 9 percent of GDP
falls short of its US and Japanese counterparts, mostly due to much lower R&D capital
intensity in ICT and other non-transport equipment-producing industries. The section
has also highlighted the strong geographical concentration, especially the scarcity of
R&D capital in the southern periphery and in the new member states of the EU.
Using our R&D capital stock estimates, we have found a positive correlation, across
industries and countries, between the initial stock of R&D capital in the early 1990s
and the growth in TFP in the subsequent decade.
Section 3.4 has put R&D capital stocks in relation to tangible capital (R&D capital
ratio), thus providing insights that cannot be gained from looking at R&D capital
intensities alone. It has revealed pronounced di¤erences in the way R&D capital and
tangible capital are combined in production across the triad but also within the EU. Put
di¤erently, variations in the intensity of tangible-capital use are not strongly aligned
with variations in R&D capital intensity.
As far as Europes gap vis-à-vis the US and Japan in business R&D is concerned,
the estimates in this study suggest that there is so much inertia in these capital stocks
that reaching the Lisbon target of 2 percent of GDP spent each year on business R&D
(and 3 percent economy-wide) is just a necessary but by no means su¢ cient step to
close the EU-US gap in R&D capital any time soon. To allow for convergence in R&D
capital stocks within the triad, signicant increases in R&D expenditure need not only
to happen but to be sustained for a long period of time.
Finally, our discussion of the geographic concentration within the EU has also
shown that there is hardly any sign of convergence in business R&D capital stocks. A
sharp geographical division of labour into R&D-intensive and less R&D-intensive areas
might be e¢ cient given the spillovers implied by knowledge-intensive activities and
the resulting tendency for these activities to cluster in space. However, countries with
very low R&D capital stocks need to ensure that they have su¢ cient technological
absorption capacity to avoid getting disconnected from growth in productivity and
living standards in the most advanced economies.
Chapter 4
R&D as investment in growth
accounting - with an application to
Germany and Slovenia
4.1 Introduction
During the last decades, knowledge has become an essential and valuable asset in the
production process especially of developed countries. For this reason, they are often
referred to as "knowledge economies". The main characteristic of a knowledge economy
is its relatively high reliance on intellectual resources, as know-how and expertise, in
comparison to physical inputs or natural resources. Therefore, there is a large literature
highlighting the importance of knowledge for productivity, output and growth. For an
overview, see e.g. Powell and Snellman (2004).
National account data, in contrast, often do not consider intellectual resources
analogously to physical resources. Nordhaus claims, after his analysis of the history
of lighting, that o¢ cial national account data "miss the most important technological
revolutions in history" (Nordhaus, 1997). This raises the question, if we should treat
expenditures on knowledge, as for example on Research and Development (R&D) in the
same way as expenditures on physical capital, as for example on machineries. So far,
the latter is treated as investment, whereas the rst one is not (see System of National
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Accounts 1993 issued by the European Commission et al., 1993). Indeed, following
Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005, p.13), we need a wider denition of capital in order
to nish this unequal treatment ensuring that "any outlay intended to increase future
rather than current consumption is capital investment". From a theoretical point of
view, this seems very plausible because the treatment of expenditures as investment
should depend on some fundamental characteristics and these should not include phys-
ical status. Evidently, there are a lot of practical problems if such a wide denition
of capital investment was implemented rigorously. For example, training expenditures
are likely to be an investment in rm specic resources, which in turn increase future
output capacities. The problem is that such expenditures are rather di¢ cult to mea-
sure accurately. For an overview and classication of intangible capital that might be
treated (partly) as investment, see Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005).
This chapter will stick to business sector R&D expenditures74 where most of them
are not treated as investment in the currently implemented version of the System of
National Accounts (SNA). Nevertheless, R&D is regularly carried out in order to gen-
erate future rather than current output. This point is taken up by the 2008 revision
of the SNA recommending to treat R&D as investment in national accounts (see Eu-
ropean Commission et al. 2009, p.206). Concerning the European Union, this new
treatment will be implemented in 201475.
This chapter will illustrate the implications of the new treatment of R&D for na-
tional accounts and its consequent e¤ects on growth accounting by giving a snapshot
on the results for some R&D intensive industries. Therefore, I will exploit data on
non-scientic business R&D of Slovenia and Germany where Helmers, Schulte and
Strauss (2009) have calculated (respectively updated) new estimates on the existing
R&D capital stocks. Before presenting this application, I will focus on the theoretical
background and discuss its crucial assumptions, for example on depreciation and on
the calculation of the rate of return. We will see that an appropriate treatment of R&D
as investment leads to a higher level of gross value added (GVA) and potentially also to
74Business R&D excludes most notably scientic R&D conducted by universities and governmental
agencies.
75Until now, satellite accounts for R&D only exist in some countries, e.g. in the U.S..
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di¤erent growth rates of GVA. Essentially, if the growth of R&D is more dynamic than
overall growth of GVA, the latter will be a¤ected positively. With respect to growth
accounting, the inclusion of R&D as an investment generates an additional production
factor. This usually leads to a decrease of total factor productivity (TFP) as the resid-
ual in growth accounting. Finally, this chapter will give an outlook on intended future
research using these data, namely the comparison of the resulting TFP-residuals over
industries and on a potential strategy to identify spillover e¤ects of R&D. Until now,
this could not be conducted mainly due to inconsistencies of the data.
Considering the related literature, this chapter builds on the already mentioned
work of Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005, 2009) who formalize the inclusion of in-
tangible capital in the well known growth accounting model of Solow (1957) and
Jorgenson-Grilliches (1967). They apply their model to the United States. Recent
studies use the Corrado-Hulten-Sichel-framework with respect to several (European)
countries leading to estimates for intangible capital and its contribution to economic
growth (e.g. Haskel, Marrano and Wallis (2009) for the UK, Fukao et al. (2009) for
Japan and Hao, Manole and van Ark (2009) for several main European countries).
A survey of several studies can be found in van Ark et al. (2009). Despite of some
crucial assumptions and measurement problems, these studies provide a rst evidence
of the strong importance of previously neglected capital goods. Further, this chapter
relates to previous work of Helmers, Schulte and Strauss (2009) who have constructed
R&D capital stocks for further countries, amongst others for Slovenia. Thereby, this
work uses the recently built EU KLEMS growth and productivity accounts which is a
sophisticated data source for growth accounting in European countries (EU KLEMS
2008a, 2009). It also o¤ers some linked data for a limited country group with patent
as well as R&D data (EU KLEMS 2008b). Alternative data sources used for growth
accounting are for example the Total Economy Growth Accounting Database of the
Groningen Growth Development Centre (see Timmer et al. 2003) and the ifo growth
accounting database with respect to Germany (see Roehn, Eicher and Strobel 2007).
Finally, from a theoretical point of view, this chapter is also related to the literature
on the return on R&D and its spillover e¤ects. For an overview of private and social
returns of R&D see for example Fraumeni and Okubo (2005), for potential treatments
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of spillovers in growth accounting see Barro (1999).
This chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 introduces the general framework
of growth accounting with R&D as investment and discusses some crucial assumptions,
section 4.3 describes the data and section 4.4 presents some rst results for Slovenia
and Germany. Section 4.5 gives some general notes and further thoughts before the
nal section concludes.
4.2 Framework of growth accounting with R&D as
investment
Before implementing R&D in a growth accounting framework, it will be claried how
the classication of R&D as investment a¤ects the national accounting identity of GDP.
This will be done in the rst part of this section. The second part uses these results
with respect to their implications for a classical growth accounting framework.
4.2.1 R&D in the national accounting identity
Following Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2009), it can be easily shown that it makes a
di¤erence for the production as well as for the income side of the accounting identity if
R&D is treated as an intermediate input or as an investment good. Let us consider an
economy with three goods, R&D (N), investment (I) and consumption (C). Assuming
rst that R&D is directly used within the period as an intermediate input, we only have
an accumulation equation for capital that is accumulated by traditional investments (I):
the capital stock (K) equals the depreciated stock of the previous period plus current
investment yielding Kt = Kt 1(1  K)+ It with K as the geometric depreciation rate
of capital. R&D (N ) can be undertaken by the use of the capital stock (K ) and labour
(L) and all three (N;K;L) are input factors for investment (I) and consumption (C).
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The production functions and corresponding ows in year t can be written as
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as the respective factor and output prices. The input factor t represents total factor
productivity at time t.
Most importantly, assuming factor compensation according to their marginal produc-
tivity, R&D does not appear in the accounting identity of GVA if it is treated as an
intermediate input:
P Yt Yt = P
C
t Ct + P
I
t It = P
L
t Lt + P
K
t Kt (4.2)
The value of output (P Yt Yt) equals only the sum of consumption and investment or the
factor compensations of capital and labour because R&D nets out on the aggregate.
Intuitively this treatment of R&D would make perfect sense if R&D has been con-
ducted for an immediate use in the production of an unique product (that will never
be replicated). But this is clearly not the usual reason why at least business R&D
is performed. As already mentioned in the introduction, everything that is produced
in order to increase future rather than current consumption theoretically qualies as
investment from the consumption side perspective. From the production side, the sym-
metry principle calls for a similar argument: everything that is produced in order to
increase output in subsequent periods (in practice after one year) should be treated as
investment.
There are, of course, some practical problems with respect to the treatment of
R&D as investment. For example, the lack of visibility how much of previous assets
in R&D still exists makes it di¢ cult to establish an appropriate depreciation rate in
an accumulation equation of R&D capital76. Another problem can be some lack of
76Further problems in the calculation of an appropriate depr. rate are discussed in subs. 4.2.4.
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veriability of R&D assets. But such problems also exist with respect to traditional
tangible investment goods and do not justify omitted e¤orts to overcome them77. All
in all, it is highly plausible to treat business R&D expenditures fully as investment
because they are generally undertaken in order to earn higher prots in the medium
and long term. Potentially associated problems should be manageable analogue to the
ones of tangible capital investments.
A full capitalization of R&D undertaken by the public sector might be more prob-
lematic because, for example, research undertaken by universities is often conducted
without the goal to yield any direct positive returns78. This chapter concentrates on
the treatment of business R&D.
Treating business R&D (N) fully as an investment, the current R&D capital stock
(Rt), generated by the accumulation equation Rt = Rt 1(1  R) +Nt, has to be used
in the production functions. Equations (4.1) become
Nt = F (L
R
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By assuming again factor compensation according to marginal productivity, the ac-
counting identity changes from (4.2) to:
P Yt Yt = P
C
t Ct + P
I
t It + P
N
t Nt = P
L
t Lt + P
K
t Kt + P
R
t Rt (4.4)
We see that the accounting identity has changed on both sides: on the product side,
R&D has been added as additional investment evaluated at its investment price PNt ;
on the income side, the R&D capital stock must be compensated by the ow of capital
77For a discussion of these issues, see again e.g. Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005).
78A further distinct feature of R&D assets, which applies to public R&D (but partly also to private
R&D), are sizable spillover e¤ects from its owner to other rms, industries or even economies. There-
fore, the non-rival character of R&D, which will also be discussed in this chapter, has to be considered
especially with respect to public R&D.
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services PRt Rt now. The factor prices P
K
t and P
R
t are called the user cost of (R&D)
capital and can be interpreted as the "rental price" of one unit of capital.
Do we indeed become richer as soon as we treat R&D or another input factor as
investment? From an accounting perspective clearly yes, as GVA unambiguously raises.
Expenditures on R&D are now treated as an output that is still there at the end of
the period (analogously to an investment in machinery) instead of treating R&D as
an intermediate input. This implies an increase of GVA by PNt Nt. As a consequence
of a higher value of output, national income must also rise equivalently by PNt Nt in
order to ensure the accounting identity to hold. How can this work in practice as loans
and interests are paid regardless how R&D is dened by economists? Here, we have to
notice that income accruing to capital is measured as a residual in national accounts,
namely as gross value added (GVA) minus labour compensation. Knowing that GVA
increases by PNt Nt, it must be a part of capital compensation that becomes larger
because the sum of salaries does not change. These increasing parts are in practice
retained earnings which were underestimated before. In the accounting identity, this
increased capital compensation must be attributed to the compensation of K and R
now79. Details on the adequate treatment of R&D in national accounts can be found
in the appendix.
I turn now to the growth accounting framework which will be built on the accounting
identity (4.4).
4.2.2 Growth accounting with intangible capital
Following the growth accounting framework introduced by Solow (1957) and Jorgen-
son - Griliches (1967), logarithmic di¤erentiation is applied to the accounting identity
(4.4) in order to calculate the growth contributions of the input factors (L;K;R) in
the production function (4.3). Thereby two crucial assumptions are needed: constant
returns to scale and factor compensation according to their marginal return on GVA.
79It will become clear in the next sections that the compensation of traditional tangible capital
may also change by a classication of R&D as investment.
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Then the sources of growth equation equals
 lnYt = s
L
t  lnLt + s
K
t  lnKt + s
R
t  lnRt + ln t (4.5)
with  indicating the changes between periods t and t   1 and with s as revenue
shares.  ln t represents the contribution of TFP. The revenue shares s are dened in
the following way as two-period averages:
sLt =
1
2

PLt Lt
P Yt Yt
+
PLt 1Lt 1
P Yt 1Yt 1

(4.6)
sKt =
1
2

PKt Kt
P Yt Yt
+
PKt 1Kt 1
P Yt 1Yt 1

sRt =
1
2

PRt Rt
P Yt Yt
+
PRt 1Rt 1
P Yt 1Yt 1

Due to the assumption of constant returns to scale it is ensured that these shares sum
up to one. This specication has also been used in the EU KLEMS database on which
this chapter will build in the next sections80. The analysis is conducted on the industry
level whereby industry-subscripts are omitted for clarity purposes.
How can this procedure be implemented? As described in the next section, the
primary source of data are national accounts which provide data on GVA on the in-
dustry level as well as on labour compensation (PLt Lt). The di¤erence between these
two must be equal to total capital compensation (PKt Kt+P
R
t Rt). Having data on the
(R&D) capital stock and estimates on the user cost of the respective stock (PKt and
PRt ) allows us to split this sum into its di¤erent asset types. Thereby, also tangible
capital K can be divided into several asset types, for example in IT and Non-IT assets.
Here, it is reasonable to assume that investors are indi¤erent between two investment
opportunities if they yield the same return such that the following arbitrage condition
must hold by dening PUk;t as user cost and P
Inv
k;t as investment price of asset k at time
t:
 P Invk;t + PUk;t+1 + (1  k)P Invk;t+1 = itP Invk;t (4.7)
80Cost shares are an alternative to revenue shares in growth accounting.
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So, an investor is indi¤erent between an investment in asset k purchased at its invest-
ment price P Invk;t (P
I
t w.r.t. tangible capital investment and P
N
t w.r.t. R&D investment
following the previous notation), lending this asset which generates revenues accord-
ing to its user cost PUk;t+1 and selling the depreciated asset in the next period for
(1   k)P Invk;t+1 on the one hand and earning a nominal rate of return i by using the
money for an alternative investment opportunity on the other hand. This must hold
for every asset type k, either tangible capital or R&D capital. Solving (4.7) for PUk;t
gives the cost of capital equation as used by EU KLEMS:
PUk;t = P
Inv
k;t 1it + kP
Inv
k;t   (P Invk;t   P Invk;t 1) (4.8)
Now, it must be claried which nominal rate of return i is applied here. There
are two competing procedures: either an appropriate exogenous value is assumed ex-
ante or the rate of return is calculated endogenously ex-post as a residual. The rst
approach uses, for example, government bond rates. The latter, which is used in
this chapter, ensures perfect consistency between income and production accounts81.
Therefore i is calculated as a residual such that overall capital compensation for all
assets (calculated as GVA minus labour compensation) is exhausted and the arbitrage
condition (4.7) holds. Due to this procedure the ex-post calculated rate of return is also
called internal rate of return. Following the EU KLEMS procedure (see EU KLEMS
2007, p.34) but integrating R&D as an asset type k and dening Cap as the sum of
tangible capital K and R&D capital R, the nominal rate of return becomes
it =
P Yt Yt   PLt Lt +
P
k
(P Invk;t   P Invk;t 1)Capk;t  
P
k
P Invk;t kCapk;tP
k
P Invk;t 1Capk;t
(4.9)
with P Yt Yt   PLt Lt as the equivalent for total capital compensation. This rate of
return must be the same for all assets but it is allowed to vary across industries (and
countries) because the procedure presented in this section is applied separately on the
industry level. Of course, one might argue that the arbitrage condition (4.7) should
also hold across industries. But this would, of course, violate the consistency between
81For a discussion, see EU KLEMS (2008a) or Erumban (2008), table 1.
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income and production accounts and contradict the general assumption in classical
growth accounting that production factors are paid according to their social marginal
productivity.
Finally, in order to aggregate several asset types into one measure of capital services,
as for example  lnKt in (4.5), the di¤erent marginal products (as for example of
investments in IT and machineries) must be considered by an appropriate weighting
procedure which employs the corresponding user cost of capital calculated in (4.8).
R&D capital might be integrated in this procedure as well or be treated separately in
order to identify Rt in (4.5). The aggregation looks as follows:
 lnKt =
X
k
vk;t lnKk;t with k 6= R&D (4.10)
vk;t =
1
2
(vk;t + vk;t 1) and vk;t = PUk;tKk;t=(
X
k
PUk;tKk;t)
In the nal parts of this section, I will discuss some crucial assumptions that are
essential in the growth accounting framework and especially focus on the depreciation
rate of (R&D) capital.
4.2.3 Discussion of some crucial assumptions
Di¤erences between the ex-ante and ex-post rates of return have already been high-
lighted (see above). Another, very fundamental assumption in growth accounting is
the marginalist principle saying that each factor is paid due to its marginal productiv-
ity on GVA. This implies that all factors are paid corresponding to their overall social
return. Therefore it is implicitly assumed that social returns are identic to private
returns. This would ensure that we are able to use the resulting factor compensation
shares in competitive markets as a correct measure in (4.6). But social returns are
often higher, notably with respect to R&D82. What happens in this case such that
there is still consistency between income and production accounts? This depends on
the character of the spillover: if a (R&D) capital asset of another rm becomes more
82For an overview of estimates of the private and social return of R&D, see e.g. Fraumeni (2005),
table 8.1.
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productive due to the spillover, then the enlarged GVA will also increase capital com-
pensation, calculated as a residual P Yt Yt   PLt Lt. This will lead ceteris paribus to a
higher internal (ex-post calculated) rate of return such that the total value of services
from the capital assets equals again total capital compensation [compare eq. (4.9)].
If, in contrast, the spillover e¤ect leads to higher labour productivity triggering higher
wages, then the di¤erence between social and private return is already accounted for in
the input factor labour. In general, growth accounting only considers the direct e¤ect
of an input factor on growth.
Moreover, also the assumption on constant returns to scale may be questioned due
to the non-rival character of some R&D investments. Barro (1999) summarizes models
with increasing returns and spillovers. He shows that growth contributions due to
spillovers of a non-rival asset may enter in TFP if the usual factor income shares from
the standard growth accounting framework are used.
This discussion is also related to the question if R&D, which is undertaken by
governments without any private return (but potential social return), should be treated
as investment in a growth accounting analysis that is based on marginalist principles.
If there is indeed no direct return on such R&D, it is highly questionable if it qualies
as an investment at all in this framework (compare Sveikauskas 2007). This chapter,
however, sticks to business R&D which is capitalized fully as already mentioned in the
beginning of this section.
The practical implementation of this framework also implies assumptions on the
depreciation rate and on the price deators used. The results are very sensitive to
both. I will have a close look on the depreciation rate in the following subsection83.
4.2.4 Depreciation rates applied to the value and e¢ ciency of
existing capital
Which features should the depreciation rate fulll ideally? First, it should be asset type
specic, so varying due to the characteristics of the specic investment. Thereby it can
83An alternative to the output based GDP-deator are e.g. labour cost based indices, more spe-
cialized output deators or a combination of output and cost based deators.
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also take into account that some investments have a higher probability to fail than oth-
ers: in doing so, a higher risk premium can be reected by a (ceteris paribus) higher
depreciation rate of the respective asset. Moreover, if we consider several industries,
it is a priori reasonable to look for depreciation rates that vary across these industries
because an investment may be faster outdated in one industry than in another. Un-
fortunately, such data on industry specic depreciation rates are not yet very reliable
with respect to R&D. For an overview of studies of the varying estimates on R&D de-
preciation rates, see for example Mead (2007), tables 1 and 2. Building ranks for these
studies by their reported depreciation rate in several main manufacturing industries
shows that also the rank of one study varies widely across industries84. Therefore such
estimates are apparently facing severe individual problems.
In contrast, depreciation rates should be constant across time (and also across
countries if we consider several ones) in order to ensure comparability. Mainly for
practical reasons, depreciation rates are assumed to be geometric ones (as commonly in
growth accounting analysis)85. The advantage thereby is that this implies no distinction
between di¤erent depreciation rates with respect to the value of the capital stock
(yielding a so called age-price prole) and for the e¢ ciency of the use of this stock as
input factor (yielding a so called age-e¢ ciency prole). The age-price and age-e¢ ciency
prole are just identic in this case such that we can also use capital stock data for the
calculation of capital services as input factors in production86.
Having presented the basic framework of growth accounting and having discussed
some crucial assumptions, I turn now to the data that are used to show some basic
results for growth accounting with R&D in Slovenia and Germany.
84Own calculations of the Persson correlation between the rank of two studies show that they are
between  0; 54 and +0; 58 and only +0; 18 in the mean.
85The use of geometric depreciation rates is also empirically supported and recommended by the
OECD, see OECD (2009), chapter 12.
86The concepts of the age-price and age-e¢ ciency prole and the underlying links to the di¤erences
between the capital stock on the one hand and the productive stock / capital services on the other hand
are described in detail in the OECD manual Measuring Capital, OECD (2009). In brief, the capital
stock measures the present wealth of the previous investments and the productive stock measures its
e¢ ciency as input factor in production. This is illustrated in gure A.4.1 of the appendix.
R&D as investment in Growth Accounting 96
4.3 Data sources
In the following I will mainly use data of the EU KLEMS growth and productivity
database (release November 2009) which o¤ers data on GVA, various labour and tan-
gible capital inputs as well as on the relevant deators and depreciation rates. This
database aims to cover the EU-25 area. Thereby it o¤ers results of a growth account-
ing analysis using labour and capital but not R&D as input factors as outlined in the
previous section (see EU KLEMS 2007). The main data source of EU KLEMS are
national accounts. The recently built database has been constructed in order to ensure
a high comparability between European countries by applying the same methodology
and assumptions to all covered countries, for example on depreciation87. Depreciation
rates are based on the industry by asset type depreciation rates from the U.S. bureau
of economic analysis as described in Fraumeni (1997). Moreover, the database is quite
detailed with respect to di¤erent asset types of capital (eight di¤erent types) but does
not o¤er data on R&D investment and on the resulting R&D capital stocks in their
main part. For some countries they are available in the EU KLEMS linked database
(release 2008). Helmers, Schulte and Strauss (2009) have added and updated R&D
capital stock data for further countries, amongst others for Slovenia. These R&D data
are based on the OECD Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development
(ANBERD) database. A drawback of this as well as for alternative data sources that
report R&D data on the industry level is that R&D is often completely assigned to
the industry where the main activity of the considered company takes place. This is
true for most European countries and implies that R&D expenditures undertaken my
multiproduct companies end up completely in their eld of main activity. This can se-
riously distort a correct assignment of R&D to industries on which growth accounting
builds on88. Therefore this problem exists also for Slovenia and Germany where I will
exemplarily look at some main manufacturing industries in the next section.
87This database has been constructed by the EU KLEMS consortium partners (e.g. the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre) who have cooperated with national statistic o¢ ces. For details see
EU KLEMS (2007).
88See also Helmers, Schulte and Strauss (2009), box 1 (or appendix 3.2 in this work) for a discussion
of associated problems. R&D expenditure data by product eld, in contrast, are scarce.
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4.4 Some rst results for Slovenia and Germany
I will concentrate on some main categories of manufacturing industries in Slovenia and
Germany: Electrical and Optical Equipment Industries (ISIC 30t33), Rubber and Plas-
tic Industries (ISIC 25), the broader category of not elsewhere classied Machineries
(ISIC 29) and partly on Chemicals (ISIC 24)89. These are some examples of indus-
tries with a relatively high use of R&D where data are su¢ ciently available. I use
Slovenia because I can analyse here R&D capital stock data of Helmers, Schulte and
Strauss (2009) who are the rst having constructed R&D capital stocks for Slovenia.
Additionally I report results for Germany due to its higher reliability because of its
size90.
Before turning to the results, I will rst concretise the main assumptions used in
the implementation and point to problems occurred within this procedure.
4.4.1 Assumptions for implementation and occurring prob-
lems
I assume a 12% depreciation rate for R&D capital which is on the lower end of existing
empirical estimates (compare again Mead 2007) but is in line with the one used in the
EU KLEMS database on which this analysis builds on. Further, all di¤erent tangible
capital data of EU KLEMS are used in the growth accounting analysis as outlined in
subsection 4.2.2. Capital services are aggregated to ICT and non-ICT capital services
analog to equation (4.10). ICT consists of the asset types computing equipment (IT),
communication equipment (CT), and software (Soft) whereas non-ICT consists of other
machinery and equipment (OMach), transport equipment (TraEq), (non-)residential
structures (RStruc, OCon) and others (Others).
EU KLEMS growth accounting results could not be recalculated exactly using the
89Industry categories are used according to the International Standard Industrial Classication of
all economic activities (ISIC).
90W.r.t. Germany, Helmers, Schulte and Strauss have only updated R&D capital stock data of
EU KLEMS. EU KLEMS R&D capital stock data for Germany have already been used in a growth
accounting analysis by van Ark et al. (2009). In contrast to this contribution, they dont focus on
R&D as the only additional investment type but do a broadly based analysis of intangibles.
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growth accounting framework outlined in this chapter (but without R&D capital as in-
put factor) although this corresponds to their methodology. Thereby, even in country-
industry pairs without any announced particularities in the data, some slight deviations
remain in the basic calculations of the internal rate of return [compare eq. (4.9)] (but
again without R&D) to the one delivered in their dataset91. Most likely, they perform
a revaluation procedure of the existing capital stock in a di¤erent procedure than an-
nounced or there are some hidden data characteristics that could not be treated with.
Further, it was impossible to come up with the same results of aggregate capital ser-
vices analog to (4.10) even by using their reported rate of return92 93. Final growth
accounting analog to (4.5), in turn, would be perfectly replicable if their capital and
labour services data were used. All in all, the following results, generated by an aug-
mentation of the original EU KLEMS data by R&D as investment, must be taken
having these problems in mind. Some rst results using these data in the (growth)
accounting framework are outlined in section 4.4.2.
4.4.2 Increase of GVA by reclassifying R&D as investment
Having noticed the data limitations in the previous subsection, there is nevertheless one
undisputed result that holds by using these data: gross value added of the investigated
industries increases in the amount of the investment costs PNt Nt by classifying R&D
as investment (see accounting identities (4.2) and (4.4)). Figure 4.1 shows that this
increase is quite impressive with respect to the mentioned manufacturing industries.
As R&D is very dynamic, the inclusion of R&D as investment can also a¤ect growth
rates of GVA signicantly, especially on the industry level where it is highly concen-
trated. For an example, the average growth rates for the chemical industry (ISIC 24)
are shown in gure 4.2 (ISIC 24 had also the most prominent level e¤ect on GVA in
gure 4.1).
91For example, the average deviation in the Electrical and Optical Equipment Industry in Slovenia
(Germany) is 7,6% (8,7%) relatively to the o¢ cial EU KLEMS data.
92The average deviation of (non-)ICT capital services indices in the Electrical and Optical Equip-
ment Industry of Slovenia and Germany are between 0,15% and 2,7%.
93Several tries have been done to overcome these problems, e.g. by using older releases of the data
and di¤erent countries.
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Figure 4.1: Increase of industry GVA by inclusion of R&D as investment
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Figure 4.2 indicates that there must be an increasing path of investments in R&D,
which is above average of overall growth of GVA, leading to higher growth rates in the
scenario with R&D as investment. Nevertheless, a pinch of salt must be taken with
respect to the results in the previous gures: as already mentioned, the assignment
of R&D to industries following the "main activity" approach can be distortive on the
industry level. Therefore such an analysis becomes more reliable (although potentially
less informative) on higher aggregate levels94.
94For further insights on the e¤ects of GVA on the aggregate level see for example Fraumeni (2005).
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Figure 4.2: Average yearly growth of industry GVA in chemical industries
Av erag e yearly g rowth of indus try G VA in chemical indus tries
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Table 4.1: Ex-post internal rate of return for some industries, 2006 (in %)
Country R&D treated as
25 29 30t33
Slovenia intermediate 10,53 10,00 9,94
investment 10,13 9,16 8,95
Germany intermediate 20,88 26,21 15,63
investment 17,05 38,19 8,85
Industry
Source: Helmers et al. (2009), own calculations (based on EU KLEMS)
Note: ISIC 24 is not shown due to data problems with residential structures in Slovenia
4.4.3 Intermediate results in growth accounting
Coming to growth accounting with R&D, table 4.1 shows the results for the internal rate
of return in (4.9) exemplarily for 2006 and compares it to the traditionally recalculated
one without R&D as investment95.
We see in this example that the rate has become smaller in most cases if R&D
is taken as an investment. Therefore it was overestimated before if we believe that
95Note again that the traditionally recalculated internal rate of return is not identic to the one by
EU KLEMS, see footnote 91.
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R&D should appropriately be treated as investment. At rst sigth, a declined internal
rate of return is very plausible because we have included another asset type meaning
that total capital compensation must be split up between more assets96. This would
lead unambiguously to a lower internal rate of return if total capital compensation
was unchanged. But this is not the case with respect to a reclassication of R&D as
investment leading to higher GVA and higher total capital compensation. Therefore, it
is impossible to say how the internal rate of return will develop in general97. Further, it
must be noticed that the internal rate varies strongly across industries (and also across
countries) in order to ensure consistency between income and production accounts.
Such a exibility might also be needed due to potential data insu¢ ciencies with respect
to a correct assignment of capital assets to industries (see discussion about the "main
activity" assignment of R&D to industries above). Of course, a comparable nominal
rate of return, e.g. government bonds, does not vary like this in reality. This indicates
that results of growth accounting, especially on the industry level as done here, should
not be overinterpreted.
The internal rate of return is calculated yearly and enters into the construction of
the user cost of the di¤erent (R&D) asset types of capital in (4.8). Adding investment
prices and depreciation rates (they do not change by a reclassication of R&D), tables
A.4.1 and A.4.2 in the appendix report the nal user cost of (R&D) capital in 2006.
Due to their positive dependence on the internal rate of return, they simply change in
the same direction as soon as R&D is reclassied.
User costs of all assets are in turn needed to construct capital services indices for
R&D and for (non-)ICT assets according to (4.10). Results on logarithmic growth of
capital services can be found in the appendix (tables A.4.3 and A.4.4).
96Recall that the internal rate of return must ensure that total capital compensation is exhausted
and that the arbitrage condition holds for all included assets.
97The changing internal rate of return is in contrast to the use of an ex-ante rate of return which
is, by construction, invariant to di¤erent treatments of R&D.
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Table 4.2: Growth contributions in Electrical and Optical Equipment (ISIC 30t33)
with and without R&D as investment (in %), Slovenia 2001-2006
Asset R&D treated Av erag e
as 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2001-2006
All (real intermediate 8,81 8,24 3,67 7,25 4,42 9,19 6,93
 GVA growth) investment 9,65 7,82 3,55 7,22 5,26 8,87 7,06
R&D intermediate - - - - - - -
investment 0,87 0,65 0,64 0,64 0,55 0,47 0,64
ICT intermediate 1,41 0,05 0,23 0,14 0,18 0,02 0,34
investment 1,42 0,05 0,21 0,13 0,17 0,02 0,33
Non-ICT intermediate 2,05 1,88 1,88 1,56 1,48 1,20 1,67
investment 1,98 1,78 1,67 1,29 1,34 1,07 1,52
Labour intermediate 0,22 0,26 1,41 1,06 -0,55 -1,26 0,19
investment 0,20 0,24 1,30 0,98 -0,50 -1,15 0,18
TFP intermediate 5,13 6,05 0,15 4,49 3,31 9,23 4,73
investment 5,18 5,11 -0,26 4,19 3,71 8,46 4,40
Year
Source: own (re)calculations, based on EU KLEMS and Helmers et al. (2009)
Notes: The contribution of labour also contains changes in the composition of labour.
4.4.4 Final results in growth accounting
The sources of growth analysis of equation (4.5) can now be performed using the results
on capital services indices underlying tables A.4.3 and A.4.4, using data on labour
compensation PLt Lt (available in the EU KLEMS database) and using compensation
shares on (non-)ICT assets (also as estimated by EU KLEMS). Table 4.2 reports the
results for Slovenia whereas the corresponding table for Germany can be found in the
appendix (table A.4.5).
The table shows the resulting composition of industry GVA growth by (non-)ICT
and R&D capital assets, labour and the residual total factor productivity (TFP) exem-
plarily for the Electrical and Optical Equipment Industry. Thereby, it compares these
results to the ones based on the EU KLEMS database that treats R&D as an interme-
diate input (by using again the recalculated estimates in order to ensure consistency).
For Slovenia I get, in the example of the Electrical and Optical Equipment Industry,
the overall result that is in line with the usual expectation if a new intangible asset
is added to growth accounting: the contribution of TFP shrinks by this inclusion98.
98In 2001 and 2005, the absolute contribution of TFP has increased, but not its relative contribution
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Moreover, also the contributions of the other factors, in this example especially of non-
ICT assets, tend to be smaller99. This is not surprising because an overestimation is
likely as long as a highly dynamic asset like R&D has been neglected. Finally, note that
GVA growth is not always higher after considering R&D as an investment, although
the level of GVA must have increased (see gure 4.1)100. The results for Germany are
similar in their basic pattern. Interestingly, Germanys Electrical and Optical Equip-
ment Industry shows more volatile growth rates in GVA although it is much bigger
compared to Slovenia. Thereby, there are also several negative contributions to growth
of the single assets101. In order to minimize such volatilites it is reasonable to focus on
the last columns in tables 4.2 and A.4.3 where the average over 2001-2006 is reported.
Here, the mentioned results become more obvious.
In general, disaggregated growth contributions may be driven by some specic char-
acteristics and should not be overinterpreted. With respect to the Electrical and Op-
tical Equipment Industry in Germany one might argue that the result can be easily
distorted by some multiproduct companies whenever its diverse activities -as in the
case of R&D- are assigned completely to its main activity. Nevertheless, this argument
does not hold for large companies (like Siemens in this example) because Germanys
statistic o¢ ces assign their activities to the correct industries if the company exceeds
a certain size102. Finally note that average TFP in Slovenia is roughly the same as in
Germany. Assuming that industry specic productivity is mainly dependant on some
industry specic technology, this nding says that such a technology is available to
the same extent in Slovenia as in Germany. Of course, this must not hold for other
industries. Further investigations are needed here103.
because also GVA has increased.
99Again, this would also hold if we were looking at their relative contributions to the respective
GVA-growth.
100Note also that the lowered contribution of labour to industry GVA growth should not lead to
the wrong conclusion that labour productivity has decreased. The opposite would be true because a
higher output can be generated with the same labour input, see also the next section.
101This is possible for capital assets whenever depreciation is relatively high compared to new
investments.
102For details on these di¤erent assignments according to the main activity or the product eld
approach, see appendix 3.2 in this work.
103The same calculations for industries ISIC 25 and ISIC 29 show at least similar TFPs in ISIC 25
of both countries.
R&D as investment in Growth Accounting 104
4.4.5 Summary
Taking the example of the Electrical and Optical Equipment Industry in Slovenia, this
section has illustrated that R&D taken as an investment rises the level of industry GVA
and can trigger a higher growth rate. By doing growth accounting with these new data,
the ex-post calculated nominal rate of return must be adjusted to ensure consistency
between income and production accounts. This rate has lowered in the considered
industries in Slovenia which also translates into new estimates for capital services.
Finally, the inclusion of R&D as investment leads to a more realistic calculation of
TFP which has been decreased here. Of course, the analysis is far from being complete
and needs to be enlarged considerably. Then it might also be possible to analyse the
pattern of TFP thoroughly. So far, weve seen that there are severe problems in the
implementation of a growth accounting framework including R&D as an investment,
for example with respect to an appropriate assignment of R&D to industries. This
limits of course the explanatory power of these results and should also be taken as a
warning not to overinterprete comparable results of other studies.
Amongst others, some further ideas about the behaviour of TFP will be outlined
in the next section. Then the nal section concludes.
4.5 General notes
It must be kept in mind that the framework of growth accounting is designed to look
at the direct e¤ects of the included assets on output and assumes factor compensa-
tion according to marginal productivity. So it is implicitly assumed in the presented
framework that investments in R&D are completely non-public goods (compare section
4.2.3). But R&D is in fact partly non-rival such that growth accounting with R&D
as investment still underestimates the importance of this asset for growth. In order
to capture the overall e¤ect of R&D on growth, alternative methods like econometric
estimates should be considered. They lead of course to other drawbacks104.
Nevertheless hints for spillover e¤ects of R&D on the overall productivity can also
104For example, there are severe simultaneity problems in such estimates.
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be detected using results from a growth accounting framework. Thereby it is possible
to argue that a high R&D capital intensity (dened as R&D capital stocks over GVA)
should have a positive impact on future productivity growth (measured by the growth
of TFP) if there are (lagged) spillovers. A positive correlation between these two
variables has been found in Helmers, Schulte and Strauss (2009, gure 12)105 where
TFP is taken from EU KLEMS and therefore calculated traditionally without R&D as
investment. A problem there is that the initial R&D capital stock may also be positively
correlated with future TFP values because R&D has been omitted as an investment
asset in the underlying production function. An initial aim of this research project was
to contribute to this discussion by calculating the corresponding TFPs in the same
growth accounting framework but with R&D treated as an investment106. If there
would still be a similar correlation between R&D capital intensity and future growth of
TFPs, this might give a more accurate hint about existing spillovers of performed R&D
leading to a higher overall productivity. Due to the mentioned problems in replication
of the original EU KLEMS results, such a comparative analysis was not possible so
far107.
Finally it must be noticed that there are even more aspects that have not been
considered in this chapter but are relevant for the outcome in growth accounting.
Especially the inclusion of taxes may also a¤ect TFP.
4.6 Conclusions
Summarizing the basic results of this chapter we have seen that industry GVA un-
ambiguously raises with respect to its level if R&D is treated as an investment. This
sometimes translates into higher growth rates, which is particular relevant for R&D
intensive industries. Finally, the inclusion of R&D as investment in growth accounting
leads to a more realistic calculation of TFP which has decreased in the shown example
105See section 3.3.4 in this work.
106For an econometric estimation strategy for private returns that are not biased by spillovers, see
Eberhard et al. (2010).
107There is no apparent strong link between R&D capital intensity and the newly calculated TFPs
by already considering the relevant pattern in the investigated industries (ISIC 24, 25, 30t33) .
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in Slovenia due to the inclusion of this additional asset. Of course, the presented re-
sults for a limited number of industries can only be seen as a snapshot and need to be
enlarged to a complete set of industries and to be aggregated to higher levels in order
to get more reliable conclusions and in order to analyse the pattern of TFP in depth.
Throughout this chapter, it has been pinpointed to crucial assumptions of growth
accounting that are especially relevant if R&D is considered as an additional type of
investment. For example, it has been argued that the results will be very sensitive
to a di¤erent depreciation pattern. Moreover, the marginalist principle of growth
accounting will often be violated in a classical growth accounting framework due to
the non-rival character of R&D investments. Nevertheless, an analysis of TFPs might
also allow to identify spillover e¤ects in a more sophisticated analysis that might be
up for future research.
All in all, the treatment of R&D as an investment is absolutely necessary from a
theoretical as well as from a practical point of view because otherwise policy makers
might draw the wrong conclusions. Nevertheless, researchers and policy makers should
keep in mind that the aimed inclusion of R&D in o¢ cial national accounts should
not lead to a careless use and interpretation of these data in a growth accounting
framework.
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Section 1.3: Double duopoly
To derive equation (1.5), we rst di¤erentiate the prot expressions in (1.3). For the
rms located in country A this yields, using the rst-order condition of the rms
optimal output choices (pi   r   tA) = (pi)0xij 8 i
dj
dtA
= xAj (p
A)0
 
dxA
dtA
 
dxAj
dtA
!
+ xBj (p
B)0
 
dxB
dtA
 
dxBj
dtA
!
  xAj   xBj 8 j = 1; 2 .
The rms located in country B face no direct e¤ect of the tax increase so that
dj
dtA
= xAj (p
A)0
 
dxA
dtA
 
dxAj
dtA
!
+ xBj (p
B)0
 
dxB
dtA
 
dxBj
dtA
!
8 j = 3; 4 .
Di¤erentiating (1.4) with respect to tA, using the above results and employing the
symmetry conditions (pA)0 = (pB)0 = p0 and xij = x 8i; j gives
 p0xij
"

BX
i=A
2X
j=1
dxij
dtA
+ (1  )
BX
i=A
4X
j=3
dxji
dtA
+
4(1  )
p0
#
= tA
BX
i=A
2X
j=1
dxij
dtA
:
Adding and subtracting (1   )
P2
j=1(dx
A
j =dt
A) and 
P4
j=3(dx
A
j =dt
A) in the square
bracket and using (dxAj =dt
A) = (dxBj =dt
A) 8 j gives equation (1.5).
With the demand function (1.6), the consumer surplus in (1.4) is u(xi)   pxi =
(xi)2=2 8 i. Using (1.7) and substituting the resulting expression along with (1.8)
Appendix to Chapter 1 108
into (1.4) yields:
max
tA
WA =
2
25
[2(a  r)  tA   tB]2 + 4
25
[a  r   3tA + 2tB]2
+
4
25
(1  )[a  r   3tB + 2tA]2 + tA4
5
[a  r   3tA + 2tB] .
The maximization problem of country B is analogous. This results in reaction functions
tA =
(a  r)(7  10)  tB
21  10 ; t
B =
(a  r)(7  10)  tA
21  10 ;
and non-cooperative tax choices in the Nash equilibrium under double duopoly (sub-
script DD)
tA(DD) = t
B
(DD) =
(a  r)(102   27+ 14)
44 + 102   42 : (A.1)
Substituting equilibrium tax rates in (A.1) back into (1.7) and (1.8) gives
xij(DD) =
(6  3) (a  r)
2(22 + 52   21) 8i; j ; j(DD) =
(6  3)2(a  r)2
2(22 + 52   21)2 8j : (A.2)
Substituting (A.2) into the national welfare expressions (1.4) gives
WA(DD) = W
B
(DD) =
(6  3)(a  r)2(102   36+ 32)
(22 + 52   21)2 : (A.3)
Equations (A.1) and (A.3) summarize tax policy and welfare in each country for dif-
ferent ownership structures, as captured by the parameter .
Section 1.4: National merger
The rmsmaximization problems are given by
max
xA12;x
B
12
12 = (a  xA)xA12 + (a  xB)xB12   (xA12 + xB12)(r    + tA) ;
max
xAj ;x
B
j
j = (a  xA)xAj + (a  xB)xBj   (xAj + xBj )(r + tB) 8 j 2 f3; 4g .
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This leads to equilibrium outputs of
xi12 =
a  r + 3 + 2tB   3tA
4
; xi3 = x
i
4 =
a  r      2tB + tA
4
i 2 fA;Bg; (A.4)
which lead to prots and consumer surplus equal to
12 =
1
8
(a  r + 3   3tA + 2tB)2; 3 = 4 =
1
8
(a  r      2tB + tA)2; (A.5)
CSA = CSB =
1
32
[3(a  r) +    2tB   tA]2: (A.6)
Substituting these into the two governmentsobjective functions
WA = CSA+12+(1 )
4X
j=3
j+t
Ax12; W
B = CSB+
4X
j=3
j+(1 )12+tB
4X
j=3
xj
yields
WA =
1
32

3(a  r) +    tA   2tB
2
+

8
 
a  r + 3   3tA + 2tB
2
+
(1  )
4
(a  r      2tB + tA)2 + 1
2
tA(a  r + 3 + 2tB   3tA); (A.7)
WB =
1
32

3(a  r) +    tA   2tB
2
+

4
(a  r      2tB + tA)2
+
(1  )
8
 
a  r + 3   3tA + 2tB
2
+ tB(a  r      2tB + tA): (A.8)
This leads to Nash equilibrium tax rates
tA(NM) =
(a  r)(19  40+ 162) + (21  48+ 162)
2(27  30+ 82) ;
tB(NM) =
(a  r)(39  76+ 322) + (9  12)
2(54  60+ 162) : (A.9)
From (A.9), eqs. (1.14) and (1.16) in the main text are obtained by setting  = 1 and
 = 0:5, respectively. Moreover, substituting (A.9) into (A.7) and (A.8) and evaluating
for  = 1 and  = 0:5, respectively, yields (1.15) and (1.17). Lastly, evaluating the
prot expressions in (A.5) for the equilibrium tax rates (1.14) and (1.16) yields (1.18).
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Section 1.5: Cross-border merger
The problem solved by the merged rm in the cross-border merger scenario is
max
xA13;x
B
13
13 =
 
a  xA

xA13 +
 
a  xB

xB13   xA13(r   s+ tA)  xB13(r   s+ tB):
Taking price discrimination and the symmetry of markets into account yields prots
of all rms and consumer surplus equal to
13 = 
A
13 + 
B
13 =
1
16
(a  r + 3s  2tA + tB)2 + 1
16
(a  r + 3s  2tB + tA)2 ;
2 = 
A
2 + 
B
2 =
1
16
(a  r   s+ tB   2tA)2 + 1
16
(a  r   s  3tA + 2tB)2 ;
4 =
1
16
(a  r   s  3tB + 2tA)2 + 1
16
(a  r   s  2tB + tA)2 ; (A.10)
CSA =
1
32

3 (a  r) + s  2tA   tB
2
; CSB =
1
32

3 (a  r) + s  2tB   tA
2
:
(A.11)
Using (A.10) and (A.11) in the objective functions of governments after a cross-border
merger
WA = 0:5(xA)2 + 0:513 + 2 + (1  )4 + tA(xA2 + xB2 + xA13) ;
WB = 0:5(xB)2 + 0:513 + 4 + (1  )2 + tB(xA4 + xB4 + xB13)
yields for country A
WA =
1
32

3(a  r) + s  2tA   tB
2
+
tA
4

3(a  r) + s  7tA + 4tB

+
1
32
(a  r + 3s  2tA + tB)2 + 1
32
(a  r + 3s  2tB + tA)2
+
(1  )
16
(a  r   s+ 2tA   3tB)2 + (1  )
16
(a  r   s  2tB + tA)2
+

16
(a  r   s  2tA + tB)2 + 
16
(a  r   s  3tA + 2tB)2 (A.12)
and analogously for country B. This yields Nash equilibrium tax rates
tA(IM) = t
B
(IM) =
(a  r)(385  736+ 2562) + s( 245 + 672  2562)
(1365  1184+ 2562) : (A.13)
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Substituting (A.13), for  = 1 and  = 0:5, back into (A.12) yields the welfare levels
given in (1.20) and (1.22). Finally, from (A.10) and (A.13) we obtain (1.23).
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Section 2.3: Results
Prices, prots and consumer surplus:
The prot maximizing problem of the rms in the benchmark scenario resulting in
the produced quantities shown in (2.3) leads to the following equilibrium prices, prots
and consumer surplus depending on tax rates:
pA(DD) = pB(DD) = a  x =
1
5
(a+ 4r + 2k + 2tA + 2tB) ;
1(DD) = 2(DD) =
2
25
(a  r)2   2
25
(a  r)(k + 6tA   4tB)
+
1
25
(13k2 + 6ktA   4ktB + 18t2A   24tAtB + 8t2B) ;
3(DD) = 4(DD) =
2
25
(a  r)2   2
25
(a  r)(k + 6tB   4tA)
+
1
25
 
13k2 + 6ktB   4ktA + 18t2B   24tAtB + 8t2A

;
CSA(DD) = CSB(DD) =
1
2
(a  pA)x =
1
2

4
5
a  4
5
r   2
5
k   2
5
tA  
2
5
tB
2
:
Analogously, in the cross-border merger scenario, using the respective optimal quan-
tities in (2.6), one gets
pA(IM) = a  x =
1
4
a+
3
4
r +
1
4
k +
1
2
tA +
1
4
tB ;
pB(IM) = a  y =
1
4
a+
3
4
r +
1
4
k +
1
4
tA +
1
2
tB ;
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f =
1
8
(a  r)2 + 2
16
(a  r)(2k   tA   tB)
+
1
16
 
2k2   2ktA   2ktB + 5t2A   8tAtB + 5t2B

;
2(IM) =
1
8
(a  r)2   2
16
(a  r)(2k + 5tA   3tB)
+
1
16
 
10k2 + 14ktA   10ktB + 13t2A   16tAtB + 5t2B

;
4(IM) =
1
8
(a  r)2   2
16
(a  r)(2k + 5tB   3tA)
+
1
16
 
10k2 + 14ktB   10ktA + 13t2B   16tAtB + 5t2A

;
CSA(IM) = CSB(IM) =
1
2

3
4
a  3
4
r   1
4
s  1
2
tA  
1
4
tB
2
:
Inserting the equilibrium tax rates of the benchmark scenario shown in (2.9) into the
respective results above I get
pA = pB = r +
1
2
k
as already stated in the main text. Benchmark prots are shown in (2.12) and consumer
surplus can be calculated as
CSA = CSB =
1
2

r   a+ 1
2
k
2
:
Analogously, using the optimal tax rates shown in (2.14) one gets with respect to
the cross-border merger
pA = pB =
2
23
a+
21
23
r +
14
23
k ;
CSA = CSB =
1
2

21
23
r   21
23
a+
14
23
k
2
and prots as shown in (2.16) in the main text.
Production of the international merged rm in one country:
If rms are faced with tax rates favorising production exclusively in one country,
the prot maximizing problem of the international merged rm must be adjusted by
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considering the corresponding tax rate on production as well as the additional trade
cost for delivering to the other country. So, if tB > tA + k holds, we have production
exclusively in country A which leads to the following maximization problem of the
merged rm f :
max
xf ;yf
f = (a  xf   x2   x4)xf   xf (r + tA)
+ (a  yf   y2   y4) yf   yf (r + tA + k) :
Thereby it underlies completely the local production tax rate.
Analogously, the international merged rm is producing exclusively in B if tA > tB+k:
This implies
max
xf ;yf
f = (a  xf   x2   x4)xf   xf (r + tB + k)
+ (a  (yf + y2 + y4) yf   yf (r + tB) :
There is no Nash equilibrium in this scenario as the only equilibrium candidate
in the resulting non-cooperative tax competition game of national welfare maximizing
governments does not fulll the respective constraint stated above for each scenario.
Intuitively, if the constraint tA > tB + k was binding such that tB is in fact a subsidy,
there would be an incentive for the government in B to choose a lower subsidy: lowering
the subsidy on the margin would incentivise the international merged rm to produce
in both countries for the respective markets. Thereby the overall o¤er in B would be
only marginally a¤ected but country B would save on subsidies for all traded entities
of the merged rm. As these subsidies are partly accruing to foreigners (as the owners
of the international merged rm), the government would have a clear incentive to save
on these expenses. Analogously, there would be an incentive to lower the tax rate in
country A if the binding constraint tA > tB + k had lead to a positive tax rate in A.
The same analysis holds symmetrically for a hypothetical exclusive production of the
mobile rm in country A.
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Cost reductions and welfare implications:
The loss in national welfare must be smaller than privately necessary cost reductions
in order to have a su¢ cient condition that any proposed international merger would
be welfare increasing. Using (2.13), (2.16) and (2.17) it must hold
Wi(IM)  Wi(DD) =
 
  2
529
(a  r)2 + 151
1058
k(a  r)  1865
4232
k2

> (f   2j)
8 k 2

d; 2
1865
(a  r)
 
23
p
29 + 151

:
Thereby we have (f   2j) =

2
529
(7a  7r + 3k)2   1
4
 
r   a+ 1
2
k
2   k2 :
This condition can be simplied to
(f   2j) = 1292116(a  r)
2   563
2116
k(a  r) + 4975
8464
k2 > 0
which is fullled even for all positive values of k.
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Appendix 3.1: Glossary of technical terms
Table A.3.1: Glossary of technical terms
Asset Types Denition
Tangible capital Stock of all assets recorded in existing national ac-
counts, which includes ICT and software, transport
vehicles, other machinery and equipment, residential
structures, non-residential structures and other assets
(e.g. live stock of plants and animals)
ICT and software Computing equipment, communication equipment
and software
Other machinery and equip-
ment
Any equipment other than ICT and transport vehi-
cles
Non-residential structures Any building or infrastructure for non-residential use
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Term Denition
R&D investment The part of a years R&D expenditure that lives
longer than one year and, hence becomes part of the
R&D capital stock. Broadly in line with the new con-
vention of the 2008 System of National Accounts, this
ratio is assumed to be 100 percent.
R&D capital stock The part of last years capital stock that has not de-
preciated plus R&D investment of the current year.
R&D intensity Ratio of R&D expenditure to value added (industry
level or aggregate)
R&D capital intensity Ratio of R&D capital stock to value added (industry
level or aggregate)
Gap in R&D Fact that one country has lower R&D intensity or
lower R&D capital intensity
R&D capital ratio (with re-
spect to total tangible capi-
tal)
Ratio R&D capital stock to total tangible capital
stock
R&D capital ratio with re-
spect to i
Ratio R&D capital stock to stock of tangible asset i
Triad Countries consisting of the EU, the US and Japan
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classication of All
Economic Activities
Industries Denition
Sector Institutional sector
Industry ISIC industry (one-letter, two-letter or two-digit)
ISIC 24 Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals
ISIC 30-33 ICT and other (non-transport) equipment
ISIC 34-35 Transport equipment
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Appendix 3.2: Cross-country comparability of R&D data at the industry
level
As stated in the main text, the comparability of industry-level R&D data is limited
across countries because countries di¤er as to whether they follow the main-activity
or the product-eld approach in collecting R&D data from companies and compiling
BERD at the industry level.
How to treat the R&D activity of a large multi-product enterprise in the compilation
of R&D statistics by industry? Consider the example of a corporation which achieves
75 percent of its sales in steel production (ISIC 271) whereas the remainder of its sales
constitutes special purpose machinery (ISIC 292). R&D expenditure can now either
be allocated entirely to the main activity of the company (ISIC 271) or be divided
between its two activities according to the actual R&D expenditure in both elds. In
practice, both ways of allocating R&D expenditure across industries exist. Another
problem is how to allocate the activity of the R&D services industry (ISIC 73). In a
number of countries, the practice has changed over time. Furthermore, data may not
be available on an annual basis and for all industries in certain countries (e.g. Austria),
for example due to a lack of annual surveys or condentiality issues (OECD 2009b).
While most of the R&D heavyweights among EU countries follow the product eld
approach, Japan and the US apply the main activity approach. For the US, this leads
to signicant amounts of R&D expenditure being recorded in service industries. For
example, the main activity of IBM is business services because it achieves most of its
turnover in that industry. But since most of its R&D is devoted to developing new
ICT equipment, the current practice gives a missleading picture of the kind of R&D
carried out.
The Czech Republic is the only country to publish data by product eld and main
activity (as from 2004). Figure A.3.1 shows the ratio of R&D expenditure by product
eld to that by main activity for 2005. For example, the economy spends seven times
as much on R&D in the eld of transport, storage and communication than the R&D
expenditure by rms mainly active in this industry (ISIC 60-64) suggests. Turning to
the most R&D-intensive industries, the di¤erences are small for Chemicals and Phar-
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maceuticals and Transport equipment. In industry group ICT and other equipment,
the main activity approach under-reports R&D in Electrical machinery and Medical
and Optical equipment (ratio above 1) while it over-reports R&D in Radio and TV,
Machinery n.e.c.. The di¤erence is very large in O¢ ce and Computing machinery, the
smallest industry in this group. All in all, di¤erences are large for individual industries
but using main activity R&D numbers is relatively unproblematic for R&D-intensive
industry groups. However, there is no guarantee that these conclusions from the Czech
example hold for other countries.
Figure A.3.1: Ratio of BERD by product eld versus BERD by main activity,
Czech Republic, 2005
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Appendix 3.3: R&D expenditure in EU countries by institutional sector
Table A.3.2: R&D expenditure in EU countries by institutional sector
Country
1995-99 2000-03 2004-07 1995-99 2000-03 2004-07 1995-99 2000-03 2004-07
Belgium 1,8 2,0 1,9 1,3 1,4 1,3 0,5 0,6 0,6
Denmark 2,0 2,4 2,5 1,2 1,7 1,7 0,7 0,8 0,8
Germany 2,3 2,5 2,5 1,5 1,7 1,8 0,7 0,7 0,8
Ireland 1,3 1,1 1,3 0,9 0,8 0,8 0,4 0,3 0,4
Greece 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,4
Spain 0,8 1,0 1,2 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,4 0,4 0,5
France 2,2 2,2 2,1 1,4 1,4 1,3 0,8 0,8 0,8
Italy 1,0 1,1 1,1 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,6
Luxembourg .. 1,7 1,6 .. 1,5 1,4 .. 0,2 0,2
Netherlands 2,0 1,8 1,7 1,1 1,0 1,0 0,9 0,7 0,7
Austria 1,7 2,1 2,4 1,1 1,4 1,7 0,6 0,7 0,7
Portugal 0,6 0,8 0,9 0,1 0,2 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5
Finland 2,7 3,4 3,5 1,8 2,4 2,5 0,9 1,0 1,0
Sweden 3,5 4,0 3,6 2,6 3,0 2,7 0,9 1,0 1,0
United Kingdom 1,8 1,8 1,7 1,2 1,2 1,1 0,6 0,6 0,7
EU-15 1,8 1,9 1,9 1,2 1,2 1,2 0,7 0,7 0,7
Bulgaria 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,4 0,4 0,4
Czech Republic 1,1 1,2 1,4 0,7 0,7 0,9 0,4 0,5 0,5
Estonia 0,6 0,7 1,0 0,1 0,2 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6
Cyprus 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,3
Latvia 0,4 0,4 0,6 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,3
Lithuania 0,5 0,6 0,8 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,5 0,5 0,6
Hungary 0,7 0,9 0,9 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,6 0,5
Malta .. 0,3 0,6 .. 0,1 0,4 .. 0,2 0,2
Poland 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,4
Romania 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,2
Slovenia 1,4 1,4 1,5 0,7 0,8 0,9 0,7 0,6 0,6
Slovakia 0,9 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,3
EU-27 1,8 1,9 1,8 1,1 1,2 1,2 0,7 0,7 0,7
United States 2,6 2,7 2,6 1,9 1,9 1,9 0,7 0,8 0,8
Japan 2,9 3,1 3,3 2,0 2,3 2,5 0,9 0,8 0,8
Total Business
Government and Higher
education
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Appendix 3.4: Assumptions made in computing R&D capital stocks
The construction of R&D capital stocks raises the same practical questions and di¢ -
culties that are known from the construction of tangible capital stocks. First, should
all R&D expenditure be treated as investment? Second, the choice of the depreciation
rate has an impact on the level of the R&D capital stock but little is known about
the service livesof industrial R&D projects. Third, the initial R&D capital stock is
unknown. A nal problem is deation: R&D investment of di¤erent years can only be
added if adjusted for changes in the price of R&D over time. The remainder of this
appendix discusses these issues in turn.
Capitalization rate:
It is assumed that 100 percent of R&D expenditure represents investment. At rst
glance, this seems to be a bold assumption. Nevertheless, business R&D is carried out
mainly to increase prots in the medium and long term. R&D expenditure therefore ts
the denition of investment as any use of resources that reduces current consumption
in order to increase it in the future (Corrado et al. 2005, p. 19). Assuming that
all R&D expenditure is undertaken to generate an economic benet to the rm, it is
justied to fully capitalize R&D expenditure. This is also in line with the guidelines
of the System of National Accounts 2008.
Depreciation rate:
There is no consensus about the appropriate depreciation rate. We use a 12 percent
rate that is constant across industries, countries and time. This assumption implies
that if a country completely stopped investing in R&D, its R&D capital stock would be
halved within ve and a half years. We opt for this depreciation rate to be consistent
with the existing R&D capital stock estimates of EU KLEMS on which we build (EU
KLEMS 2008b, p. 12). Indeed, the choice of an appropriate rate is not straightforward
as only few and divergent studies are available. A depreciation rate of 12 percent
lies at the lower end of rates used in the literature. In an overview, Mead (2007)
nds plausible rates between 12 and 20 percent. Van Ark et al. (2009) quote a range
between 11 and 26 percent and use a rate of 20 percent in their estimates. This high
variation in depreciation rates partly stems from di¤erent methods (e.g. patent renewal
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or market valuation models), none of them being completely satisfying. Moreover, in
line with EU KLEMS (2008b) and van Ark et al. (2009), we do not account for
potential di¤erences in depreciation across industries, countries or over time because
estimates in the literature are not converging. If anything, some tentative evidence is
available for di¤erences across industries. Starting in 2007, the US statistical authority
has been writing o¤R&D capital in transport equipment somewhat faster (18 percent)
and that in Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals somewhat more slowly (12 percent) than
R&D capital in other industries, for which a rate of 15 percent is applied (Mead 2007).
Initial capital stock:
The initial capital stock is calculated by extrapolating R&D expenditure growth of the
initial years back to the past. Ideally, one should use a long time series and assume an
initial capital stock of zero. Since time series of R&D expenditure are relatively short,
we follow the strategy used by EU KLEMS. We calculate the average expenditure
growth rate of the rst seven years with available data and assume that this growth
rate prevailed in the past. Taking depreciation into account, an initial capital stock is
calculated for the rst year of available data. The impact on the initial capital stock
of violating this assumption diminishes over time. To illustrate, assume that (i) the
initial capital stock obtained through the described procedure is 100; (ii) the true (but
unknown) initial stock is 120; and (iii) R&D expenditure is equal to 12 in every year
with available data. In year 7, the measured R&D capital stock is still 100 while the
true one has come down to 108, converging to 100 over time. To be on the save side,
we do not show the R&D capital stocks obtained from the rst seven years of R&D
expenditure data.
Deator of R&D expenditure:
As EUKLEMS, we use the GDP deator. Alternatively, one could combine labour costs
and output price indices of relevant industries in order to account for extraordinary
productivity gains in producingR&D. For an overview and practical problems, see
Fraumeni and Okubo (2005).
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Appendix 3.5: Data sources and methods for the computation of R&D
capital stocks
Our main data source for the construction of R&D capital stocks is the ANEBERD
database of the OECD (2009b). This dataset contains R&D expenditure by industry
performed in the business enterprise sector classied according to ISIC revision 3.1.
ANBERD data are based on o¢ cial data of business expenditure on R&D (henceforth
OFFBERD), provided by national statistical authorities. In contrast to OFFBERD,
ANBERD includes estimates for missing years as well as for industries that were sup-
pressed for condential reasons. The industry breakdown is quite detailed but must
be used cautiously as there is some over- and underestimation in some countries where
R&D expenditure data are not available on a product eld basis (see subsection 3.2.2).
This problem is relevant especially with respect to lower industry aggregates. The
potential bias becomes smaller with aggregation over industries provided a bottom-up
approach is applied (see below). In this chapter we only show aggregates of the main
ISIC industries (one- and two-letter industries).
This aggregation over industries is also necessary in order to ensure compatibil-
ity with EU KLEMS data for R&D capital stocks up to 2003, which represent our
second main data source. For a general description of the EU KLEMS project and
databases see OMahony and Timmer (2009). EU KLEMS o¤ers data for 13 EU coun-
tries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and UK), the US and Japan. EU KLEMS also
used ANBERD data as their primary source. We replicate their methodology by using
the Perpetual Inventory Method (described in appendix 3.4) for the construction of
capital stocks out of current R&D expenditure, using the GDP deator to obtain real
expenditure.
With respect to data coverage, R&D capital stocks of EU KLEMS are available
from 1980 onwards for all countries except Belgium (1994), the Czech Republic (1999)
and Poland (2001). We update the EU KLEMS estimates using the newest ANBERD
edition (covering years up to 2005 or 2006). Moreover, we add seven additional EU
countries not available in the EU KLEMS database: Greece, Hungary, Austria, Por-
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tugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Turkey. The time coverage of our additional countries
is more limited due to the requirement of consistent R&D expenditure data for a suf-
cient period. More precisely, we have estimated an initial capital stock as early as
possible (e.g. 1993 for Slovenia). As done by EU KLEMS, we suppress the rst seven
years due to their sensitivity to the estimated initial stock (see appendix 3.4). As a
result of this suppression, our R&D capital stock estimates have the following starting
years: 1995 for Greece and Portugal, 2000 for Slovenia, 2001 for Hungary, 2004 for
Turkey and 2005 for Austria and Slovakia. For Slovakia, the limitation is that the
R&D expenditure data of OECD (2009b) are in fact OFFBERD data with relatively
low industry coverage.
As far as the aggregation of single industries to higher aggregates is concerned, we
apply a bottom-up approach whenever su¢ cient industry information is available in
order to avoid aggregation bias in the computation of initial capital stocks. Specically,
we calculate initial R&D capital stocks of two-letter ISIC industries to aggregate them
to one-letter industries. Moreover, we use R&D capital stocks of one-letter industries in
the computation of total manufacturingand total servicesbut not for the overall
computation of total industries.
Finally, EU aggregates are computed as follows. For non-euro area members, all
relevant variables (R&D capital stocks, tangible capital stocks and value added) at the
aggregate and industry levels are converted into euros using average market exchange
rates of the year 1999. Then the euro values for the available countries of EU-27 are
added together separately for each variable, thereby ensuring that the same sample is
used for the component variables of ratios. For example, the EU R&D capital stock
used in computing the EUs R&D capital ratio comprises fewer countries than that
used for the R&D capital intensity because tangible capital stocks are available for
fewer countries.
Appendix to Chapter 4
Section 4.2: Framework of growth accounting with R&D as investment
Entries in national accounts depending on the status of R&D:
National income and production accounts distinguish between four activity accounts
in order to capture all transactions in a closed economy. These are the production,
income, capital and nancing accounts which can be constructed on the microeconomic
level as well as on the sectoral or national aggregate. This appendix shows how these
accounts are a¤ected by R&D depending on its status as investment or intermediate
consumption. Therefore I consider an additional research project that is done with
some additional labour input.
First, let us assume that this research project is not classied as investment. It is
instead an intermediate input to another output, for example a chemical product. This
project would show up on the microeconomic level of a company as follows: researchers
have to be paid a loan which enters on the debit side of the production account. As
the output of the research project cannot be capitalized, the project would not show
up as own-account capital formation on the credit side of this account. This side
consists essentially of sales, changes of inventories and own-account capital formation.
Assuming that the research project increases the sales value only in the long run,
nothing would be added to the credit side. Now it must be ensured that also the debit
side (to which the salaries of the researchers have been added) show the same sum as
before. This can be ensured by adjusting the balance position on this side which are
retained earnings. What does this imply for the calculation of gross value added (GVA)
and gross domestic product (GDP)108 from the income side? Respecting that retained
108GVA is linked to GDP by adding taxes and subtracting subsidies.
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earnings and loans are both part of them, GDP is just unchanged by this additional
research project as these two positions net out.
This picture changes if the research project was classied as investment: then also
the credit side of the production account would change by adding the output of the
research project as own-account capital formation analogously to a self-constructed
machinery. This implies that the debit side must not be adjusted by lowering retained
earnings and GDP will indeed increase in comparison to the initial treatment of the
research project as intermediate consumption.
Let us also briey discuss further implications to the other national accounts on the
rm level: rst, retained earnings on the debit side of the production account are equal
to retained earnings on the credit side of the companys income account. Here the
counterpart on the debit side are savings (after considering taxes). Therefore, higher
retained earnings in the investment scenario result in higher savings. So, classica-
tion of R&D as investment increases national savings. Savings, in turn, show up on
the credit side of the capital account. Finally, this account, which also includes own-
account capital formation as part of gross xed capital formation (investments) on the
debit side, is simply enlarged identically on both sides if we treat the research project
as investment. Therefore, the balance position, which is nancial decit or surplus, is
unchanged in the capital account. This makes perfect sense as the company has acti-
vated a new investment which is conventionally evaluated at its investment costs. In
contrast, if the project is treated as intermediate consumption, we get a lower nancing
surplus (or higher nancing decit) as the countervailing part on the debit side of the
capital account. Finally, this nancing decit or surplus carries over inversely to the
companys nancing account.
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Figure A.4.1: Capital stocks versus capital services
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Section 4.4: Some rst results for Slovenia and Germany
Table A.4.1: User cost of capital in 2006 (Euro), Slovenia
Asset R&D treated as
25 29 30t33
R&D intermediate - - -
investment 0,38 0,37 0,36
IT intermediate 0,32 0,31 0,31
investment 0,31 0,31 0,31
CT intermediate 0,30 0,29 0,29
investment 0,30 0,29 0,28
Soft intermediate 0,66 0,65 0,65
investment 0,65 0,64 0,64
TraEq intermediate 0,46 0,41 0,38
investment 0,45 0,40 0,36
Omach intermediate 0,28 0,26 0,27
investment 0,27 0,25 0,25
Ocon intermediate 0,25 0,24 0,24
investment 0,24 0,22 0,22
RStruc intermediate 0,18 0,16 0,16
investment 0,17 0,15 0,14
Other intermediate 0,44 0,41 0,40
investment 0,43 0,39 0,37
Industry (ISIC)
Table A.4.2: User cost of capital in 2006 (Euro), Germany
Asset R&D treated as
25 29 30t33
R&D intermediate - - -
investment 0,91 0,22
IT intermediate 0,10 0,11 0,09
investment 0,10 0,13 0,08
CT intermediate 0,26 0,29 0,22
investment 0,23 0,38 0,18
Soft intermediate 0,47 0,51 0,42
investment 0,44 0,61 0,36
TraEq intermediate 0,43 0,46 0,34
investment 0,39 0,59 0,27
Omach intermediate 0,35 0,39 0,28
investment 0,31 0,52 0,21
Ocon intermediate 0,21 0,28 0,19
investment 0,17 0,40 0,12
RStruc intermediate - - -
investment - - -
Other intermediate 0,28 0,31 0,23
investment 0,25 0,40 0,18
Industry (ISIC)
Source: EU KLEMS, own calculations
Notes: - User costs for the scenario with R&D as intermediates have been computed using
  the recalculated nominal rate of return of table 4.1 in order to ensure consistency.
- ISIC 24 is not shown due to data problems with residential structures in Slovenia.
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Table A.4.3: Logarithmic growth of capital services in ISIC 30t33 (in %), Slovenia
2001-2006
Asset R&D treated as
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
R&D intermediate - - - - - -
investment 10,09 7,54 6,36 5,47 5,37 4,71
ICT intermediate 19,33 0,76 3,57 2,14 3,18 0,29
investment 19,48 0,77 3,64 2,23 3,30 0,32
Non-ICT intermediate 10,91 9,33 8,68 7,05 8,31 5,49
investment 10,98 9,34 8,74 7,24 8,50 5,56
Year
Table A.4.4: Logarithmic growth of capital services in ISIC 30t33 (in %), Germany
2001-2006
Asset R&D treated as
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
R&D intermediate - - - - - -
investment 0,86 0,18 -0,19 -0,10 -0,27 0,76
ICT intermediate 13,34 3,98 0,47 -1,12 2,82 7,62
investment 13,45 3,95 0,47 -1,11 2,91 7,79
Non-ICT intermediate 5,37 0,11 -1,25 -0,39 -0,20 0,48
investment 5,41 0,13 -1,25 -0,42 -0,16 0,53
Year
S ource: E U K L E MS , own calculations
Notes : Us er cos ts  for the scenario with R &D as  intermediates  have been computed us ing
the recalculated nominal rate of return of table 4.1 in order to ens ure cons is tency.
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Table A.4.5: Growth contributions in Electrical and Optical Equipment (ISIC 30t33)
with and without R&D as investment (in %), Germany 2001-2006
Asset R&D treated as
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
All (real intermediate -9,27 0,95 6,11 10,91 4,00 12,63
   G V A  growth) investment -6,60 0,38 5,33 10,19 3,98 12,56
R&D intermediate - - - - - -
investment 0,10 0,02 -0,02 -0,01 -0,04 0,12
ICT intermediate 0,38 0,10 0,01 -0,03 0,09 0,23
investment 0,36 0,10 0,01 -0,02 0,07 0,19
Non-ICT intermediate 0,57 0,01 -0,17 -0,07 -0,04 0,10
investment 0,52 0,01 -0,13 -0,05 -0,02 0,07
L abour intermediate 0,65 -3,14 -3,31 1,85 -2,52 1,20
investment 0,57 -2,78 -2,95 1,66 -2,27 1,08
TF P intermediate -10,86 3,98 9,58 9,16 6,47 11,10
investment -8,15 3,04 8,43 8,61 6,23 11,10
Year
Source: own (re)calculations, based on EU KLEMS and Helmers et al. (2009)
Notes: The contribution of labour also contains changes in the composition of labour.
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